Saturday, November 5, 2016

Keep Calm & Don't let FiveThirtyEight get to you this weekend!

Or: how I learned to stop worrying and love the election.

If you're like me, and most Democrats, or just people who agree with my friend's facebook encapsulation: "You cannot be for Trump and for common decency," you may be spending this weekend freaking out each time you refresh Nate Silver's prediction website and see Hillary's chance of winning the election declining by a fraction of a percentage point.

But as a political scientist & specialist on elections & parties--as well as a junkie of this election, and a dab hand at quantitative analysis in politics, I wanted to share a few observations that I hope might help preserve some people's arterial walls in the next three days.

Here are three big reasons why the closer we get to the election, the less sense this seemingly precipitous decline seems to make (and, keep in mind, Mr. Silver & co would still say the chances of Hillary winning are almost double what Trump's are):

  1. Math of the electoral college: Hillary Clinton could lose Florida, Nevada, Iowa, & Ohio (that Obama won), plus North Carolina, where she's been ahead in polling (and which Obama won in 2008), and still be president, as long as she wins Pennsylvania & New Hampshire (last won by a Republican in 1988 & 2000, respectively--are Keystone & Granite staters really going to let you-know-who lure them over to the Republican side after having turned their noses up at more respectable Republicans like Mitt Romney, John McCain, and the Bush family?)
  2. Early voting doesn't seem to have a meaningful place in Silver's forecast model, and in two of Trump's must-win states, the story for the Republican looks much grimmer than Silver's outcast predicts:
    • Nevada, which Silver's projections give Trump a 50.5-51.1% chance of winning, seems like a lock for Hillary, considering early voting, which ended there yesterday.  Probably at least two thirds of all votes that will be cast in the state have already been cast, and 73,000 more Democrats have cast ballots than Republicans.  In 2012, Obama won Nevada by about 68,000 votes (a comfortable, if not huge 6.5% margin), after Dem-registered voters cast 71,000 more early votes than Republicans did.  So Hillary is farther ahead of Trump in Nevada than Obama was ahead of Mitt Romney (the first Mormon candidate--NV's electorate has one of the largest Mormon blocs after UT).  To imagine that Trump actually has a slightly better chance of winning Nevada than Hillary now is to imagine a rather preposterous degree of uncertainty in what will happen on Nov 8.
    • In Florida, Democrat-registered voters have a lead in early voting, too, although it doesn't compare nearly as well with 2012.  They lead by just about 7,000 votes, as opposed to 104,000 four years ago, when Obama won the state by just 74,000 votes.  Of course, if that were the only info we had, that difference of 97,000 votes is more than enough to erase Obama's final margin.  But from Florida, we also have information about the ethnicity of early voters, and the big change in Florida this year is the huge growth in the Latino vote: although early voting is still going on today, as of yesterday, Latinos had cast nearly 600,000 early votes, or 14% of all early votes (compared to just 300,000 in 2008--the last year with comparable data, when Obama won Florida by 240,000 votes).  In 2012, Latinos accounted for less than 10% of early votes, on their way to account for 17% of all votes in the state that year.
      And this year, there are a lot more Latino voters in Florida, and most of the newcomers are US citizens from Puerto Rico (who lean Democrat, as opposed to the stereotypical Cuban-Floridian voter, who leans Republican), while the total number of white-only voters in the state has declined has declined by 1.5% from 2012.
      While the early voting picture in Florida is not as contradictory to the idea of Trump winning the state as in Nevada, Silver's projection of Trump with a 52.4-53.3% chance of winning the state should not make us simply cast it on Trump's pile in our mental electoral-college maps
    • I could go on with similar stories about places like Arizona, Iowa, and North Carolina where already-in early-voting numbers that aren't built into Silver's model tell a much more hopeful story for Hillary than the numbers on Silver's map (Trump with a 74.1-76.1% chance in AZ, 68.7-70.0% in IA, and 51.7-53.7% in NC), but more meaningful is an investigation of how the model's calculations are currently "grade-inflating" Trump's polling numbers in states across the country.
  3. Head-scratching aspect of the FiveThirtyEight model: One big part of Silver's calculation of the final vote-estimate is based on how much each state's vote-outcome correlates with with national polls.  A big part of this is the trend-line adjustment that Silver adds on top of his polling averages for each state.  That is to say: if a candidate seems to have gained in national polls in the past weeks or months, then Silver's model if the polls in a given state haven't moved much in the period, those state polls must be under-counting that candidate's likely final vote outcome.
    The upshot is that in calculating the current estimates (estimates, we should hasten to emphasize, as Silver would) of the final-outcome vote shares, which he then uses for his percent-chance calculations, Silver's model adds on some "missing" voters for Trump to whatever the adjust poll averages say: about a 2% "bonus" for Trump across all the states.
    Thus, if the polling average (adjusted for the partisan leans of the polls) in, for example:
    • NH is 43.9-40% (Clinton +3.9%), the "Trend Line Adjusted" average is 43.9-41.9% (Clinton +2%).
    • OH is 42.8-43.2% (Trump +0.4%), the TLA avg is 43.0-45.6% (Trump +2.6%)
    • NC is 45.5-43.6% (Clinton +1.9%), the TLA avg is 45.3-45.5% (Trump +0.2%)

      Thus,
      Trump's projected chances in all these races are much higher than if Silver didn't believe all the state-poll averages were under-counting Trump.  NH looks much tighter for Clinton, OH looks like a decent lead for Trump, rather than a neck-and-neck, and NC looks neck-and-neck for Trump, rather than a tight lead for Clinton.  While this built-in calculation of the model might normally make sense, the yawning 2% Trump bonus that the current set of polls produces for it seems way too big to bank on.

      Now
      , maybe the all these state polls really are "missing" the "Trump-bump" that Silver's calculations find in the national polls, but I find big (cardiac-muscle-saving) solace in doubting that these and other well-polled states are all under-counting Trump's final strength, come Tuesday night.
In conclusion, although I know lots of people who love FiveThirtyEight's statistical sophistication and history of good predictions (though not Trump's primary victory!), but justifiably fear a Trump presidency, may be freaking out this weekend, There are three big reasons we should all step back from our windowsills & balconies: 1) Democratic Electoral College advantages that mean Trump would have to be the best Republican candidate in 30 years to win. 2) Early-voting info that seems to confound the polling predictions.  3) The fact that the polling predictions are based on an assumed under-counting of Trump's support in all the state polls.

A final big reason to breathe easy is organization: The Clinton campaign has something like four times as many people organizing Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) phone banks, door-knocking, and other activities as the Trump campaign does.  And they have been at it longer.  Clinton's side began staffing up in swing states 7-8 months ago, building lists of volunteers to door-knock the data-chosen voters, networks of civil-society allies, and armies of organizers (including some great vets of Bernie's campaign!) to make it all happen.  Trump has nothing like this, and the Republican party has barely been scrambling in just the past month or two to come up with some semblance of ground game, and fallen far short.  Having been out there for months for Bernie, and known dozens if not hundreds of others who've done that, and also who are out for Hillary, this matters.  Not enough to create a swamping landslide, but by enough (2-4%?) in a close election like this that it should hearten us.

So we should all Keep Calm, and Carry on--and direct any restless energy we might have into some GOTV calling!

Keep Calm & Don't let FiveThirtyEight get to you this weekend!

Or: how I learned to stop worrying and love the election.

If you're like me, and most Democrats, or just people who agree with my friend's facebook encapsulation: "You cannot be for Trump and for common decency," you may be spending this weekend freaking out each time you refresh Nate Silver's prediction website and see Hillary's chance of winning the election declining by a fraction of a percentage point.

But as a political scientist & specialist on elections & parties--as well as a junkie of this election, and a dab hand at quantitative analysis in politics, I wanted to share a few observations that I hope might help preserve some people's arterial walls in the next three days.

Here are three big reasons why the closer we get to the election, the less sense this seemingly precipitous decline seems to make (and, keep in mind, Mr. Silver & co would still say the chances of Hillary winning are almost double what Trump's are):

  1. Math of the electoral college: Hillary Clinton could lose Florida, Nevada, Iowa, & Ohio (that Obama won), plus North Carolina, where she's been ahead in polling (and which Obama won in 2008), and still be president, as long as she wins Pennsylvania & New Hampshire (last won by a Republican in 1988 & 2000, respectively--are Keystone & Granite staters really going to let you-know-who lure them over to the Republican side after having turned their noses up at more respectable Republicans like Mitt Romney, John McCain, and the Bush family?)
  2. Early voting doesn't seem to have a meaningful place in Silver's forecast model, and in two of Trump's must-win states, the story for the Republican looks much grimmer than Silver's outcast predicts:
    • Nevada, which Silver's projections give Trump a 50.5-51.1% chance of winning, seems like a lock for Hillary, considering early voting, which ended there yesterday.  Probably at least two thirds of all votes that will be cast in the state have already been cast, and 73,000 more Democrats have cast ballots than Republicans.  In 2012, Obama won Nevada by about 68,000 votes (a comfortable, if not huge 6.5% margin), after Dem-registered voters cast 71,000 more early votes than Republicans did.  So Hillary is farther ahead of Trump in Nevada than Obama was ahead of Mitt Romney (the first Mormon candidate--NV's electorate has one of the largest Mormon blocs after UT).  To imagine that Trump actually has a slightly better chance of winning Nevada than Hillary now is to imagine a rather preposterous degree of uncertainty in what will happen on Nov 8.
    • In Florida, Democrat-registered voters have a lead in early voting, too, although it doesn't compare nearly as well with 2012.  They lead by just about 7,000 votes, as opposed to 104,000 four years ago, when Obama won the state by just 74,000 votes.  Of course, if that were the only info we had, that difference of 97,000 votes is more than enough to erase Obama's final margin.  But from Florida, we also have information about the ethnicity of early voters, and the big change in Florida this year is the huge growth in the Latino vote: although early voting is still going on today, as of yesterday, Latinos had cast nearly 600,000 early votes, or 14% of all early votes (compared to just 300,000 in 2008--the last year with comparable data, when Obama won Florida by 240,000 votes).  In 2012, Latinos accounted for less than 10% of early votes, on their way to account for 17% of all votes in the state that year.
      And this year, there are a lot more Latino voters in Florida, and most of the newcomers are US citizens from Puerto Rico (who lean Democrat, as opposed to the stereotypical Cuban-Floridian voter, who leans Republican), while the total number of white-only voters in the state has declined has declined by 1.5% from 2012.
      While the early voting picture in Florida is not as contradictory to the idea of Trump winning the state as in Nevada, Silver's projection of Trump with a 52.4-53.3% chance of winning the state should not make us simply cast it on Trump's pile in our mental electoral-college maps
    • I could go on with similar stories about places like Arizona, Iowa, and North Carolina where already-in early-voting numbers that aren't built into Silver's model tell a much more hopeful story for Hillary than the numbers on Silver's map (Trump with a 74.1-76.1% chance in AZ, 68.7-70.0% in IA, and 51.7-53.7% in NC), but more meaningful is an investigation of how the model's calculations are currently "grade-inflating" Trump's polling numbers in states across the country.
  3. Dubious aspect of the FiveThirtyEight model: One big part of Silver's calculation of the final vote-estimate is based on how much each state's vote-outcome correlates with with national polls.  A big part of this is the trend-line adjustment that Silver adds on top of his polling averages for each state.  That is to say: if a candidate seems to have gained in national polls in the past weeks or months, then Silver's model if the polls in a given state haven't moved much in the period, those state polls must be under-counting that candidate's likely final vote outcome.
    The upshot is that in calculating the current estimates (estimates, we should hasten to emphasize, as Silver would) of the final-outcome vote shares, which he then uses for his percent-chance calculations, Silver's model adds on some "missing" voters for Trump to whatever the adjust poll averages say: about a 2% "bonus" for Trump across all the states.
    Thus, if the polling average (adjusted for the partisan leans of the polls) in, for example:
    • NH is 43.9-40% (Clinton +3.9%), the "Trend Line Adjusted" average is 43.9-41.9% (Clinton +2%).
    • OH is 42.8-43.2% (Trump +0.4%), the TLA avg is 43.0-45.6% (Trump +2.6%)
    • NC is 45.5-43.6% (Clinton +1.9%), the TLA avg is 45.3-45.5% (Trump +0.2%)

      Thus,
      Trump's projected chances in all these races are much higher than if Silver didn't believe all the state-poll averages were under-counting Trump.  NH looks much tighter for Clinton, OH looks like a decent lead for Trump, rather than a neck-and-neck, and NC looks neck-and-neck for Trump, rather than a tight lead for Clinton.  While this built-in calculation of the model might normally make sense, the yawning 2% Trump bonus that the current set of polls produces for it seems way too big to bank on.

      Now
      , maybe the all these state polls really are "missing" the "Trump-bump" that Silver's calculations find in the national polls, but I find big (cardiac-muscle-saving) solace in doubting that these and other well-polled states are all under-counting Trump's final strength, come Tuesday night.
In conclusion, although I know lots of people who love FiveThirtyEight's statistical sophistication and history of good predictions (though not Trump's primary victory!), but justifiably fear a Trump presidency, may be freaking out this weekend, There are three big reasons we should all step back from our windowsills & balconies: 1) Democratic Electoral College advantages that mean Trump would have to be the best Republican candidate in 30 years to win. 2) Early-voting info that seems to confound the polling predictions.  3) The fact that the polling predictions are based on an assumed under-counting of Trump's support in all the state polls.

A final big reason to breathe easy is organization: The Clinton campaign has something like four times as many people organizing Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) phone banks, door-knocking, and other activities as the Trump campaign does.  And they have been at it longer.  Clinton's side began staffing up in swing states 7-8 months ago, building lists of volunteers to door-knock the data-chosen voters, networks of civil-society allies, and armies of organizers (including some great vets of Bernie's campaign!) to make it all happen.  Trump has nothing like this, and the Republican party has barely been scrambling in just the past month or two to come up with some semblance of ground game, and fallen far short.  Having been out there for months for Bernie, and known dozens if not hundreds of others who've done that, and also who are out for Hillary, this matters.  Not enough to create a swamping landslide, but by enough (2-4%?) in a close election like this that it should hearten us.

So we should all Keep Calm, and Carry on--and direct any restless energy we might have into some GOTV calling!

Sunday, September 25, 2016

Two Elections: Russia & America, mirrors of Apathy & Stability

Russia's 2016 Parliamentary Elections--Sunday, September 18 2016

Last Sunday, about 48% of eligible Russian voters (according to official data) turned out to give Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party a victory in the 4th parliamentary election since he came to power.  It's been dubbed Russia's most boring election yet.  The government probably manufactured about two fifths of its victory through fraud, but the 2nd, 3rd, & 4th place parties all support the Putin system, too, and the only parties that truly stand as opposition attracted the votes of barely a twentieth of those bothered to show up.  This is one of the lowest turnout national elections Russia has seen since the fall of Communism (although the 36% of Americans who voted in our last Congressional elections is even worse).  Are Russians suffering under Putin's regime, and thus desirous of a change, but too afraid to vote for it?  Or is the Russian electorate genuinely quiescent because hardly anybody is really that dissatisfied with the system?

Two years into Russia's most severe recession since the 1990s, the latter answer seems correct to me.  From my many trips there, and contacts I keep up with friends and former students there, the impression I've always had reflects the perspective one Russian facebook user posted about on Monday, to explain why Russians of his generation don't come out in support of the opposition.  The late 1980s and 1990s in Russia were so horrific, economically, and left such an indelible mark on Russians' political consciousness, that they have become the touchstone for comparison to determine how things are now.  In 2016, budgets have been cut, inflation is up (especially on food), and in a few places wage arrears (employers--including government entities--can't make payroll, and so simply fall into arrears in what they owe workers, sometimes for weeks or months) have shown up again.  But unlike the 1990s, nobody is losing their life savings to inflation.  People all have jobs and enough to eat.  Apartment blocks aren't wallowing in horrific states of dilapidation, nor being blown up by terrorists.  People have cars, access to health care, and many can still afford seaside vacations (many in newly-acquired Crimea, which is ironically probably cheaper now than it was three years ago, the last time Russians vacationed there under a Ukrainian government).

Could things in Russia be better?  Of course they can--Russians were doing extremely well economically less than a decade ago.  But that was under Vladimir Putin's rule, as well, so why vote against his party?  Today's democratic opposition, as disorganized and divided by petty personal ambitions as it is, is also directly connected in Russians' minds to the 1990s, the Yeltsin era--and economic depression that has no comparison in the minds of today's Russians.  The idea that a European standard of living and degree of public freedom, a reduction of corruption and the installation of a pluralistic society with the levels of comfort and opportunity that people enjoy in Germany, France, the Low Countries, or even the Central European post-communist countries that are now in the EU seems unrealistic for most Russians.  These social goals, that inspired Ukrainian protesters in late 2013 and early 2014 who wanted to bring that country into the family of Europe simply don't look plausible in Russia.

So then, why rock the boat?  On the whole, Russians would prefer the known path they are on, even if it seems headed downhill, than to blaze a trail off in a new direction--perhaps over a cliff.  And the majority of Russians would really just rather live their own lives, attend to the prospects of their own family, friends, and themselves, then wear themselves out engaging in politics, which at best cannot change things, at worst could be dangerous, and in any event will be exhausting and dispiriting to those who have any public spirit to begin with.

Americans: Citizens or Subjects?  Participants in Democracy?

The majority of Americans are almost exactly like the majority of Russians, in terms of how they feel about commitments to their own, personal, private spheres vs the public sphere and participation in their own democratic government.  Americans have a far higher quality of democracy than do Russians: far less corrupt, far more open to participation (which is far safer), far more avenues to voice their opinions, and far more competition and capacity to hold their leaders accountable than Russians.  But while some Americans take up the privileges and duties of citizens of a democracy, the vast majority of them don't act like they live in or care about democracy--they act just like the majority of Russians do.

Here in Texas, I've been working in the past week to register voters, which means walking up to complete strangers, asking point-blank if they're registered to vote yet, and if they want to, then helping them fill out a brief form.  While many students and grocery-store customers have been willing to, the great majority are not willing to register.  Of those who won't, many will respond that the choice they face for president this year is so dismal that they're not interested.  Others, expressing something similar, say it won't matter who they vote for, because all the choices are bad.  (The majority of those who refuse have clearly not even thought enough about it to articulate, or probably even have, a reason.)

While these opinions are certainly disputable, what is indisputable is that the reason we have the two most unpopular major-party nominees in history is that the huge majority of Americans didn't care to participate in the primaries: On the Democratic side, about 17 million people voted for Hillary Clinton, and 14 million against her, while on the Republican side, 13 million voted for Donald Trump, and 16 million against him.  While the fairness, process, funding, and media attitudes during the primaries are all open to criticism by those who don't like one, the other, or both candidates, the greater truth is this: 160 million Americans eligible to participate in the process that produced these two candidates failed to do so.  Maybe some were physically, financially, or bureaucratically unable to participate, but not all of them, nor surely even a significant portion.  If just one tenth of those who failed to show up when we picked our major party nominees (a process that's been virtually unchanged in most of our lifetimes, that is taught about in required classes in middle schools, high schools, and many colleges--at least here in Texas it's required), had done so and voted for other candidates--against Hillary & Donald--we would have a different pair of nominees this November.  This is indisputable.

The fact that those who claim they won't participate now because they don't like the choices on offer have no one but themselves to blame (their own failure to participate during the primaries) is piquant, but probably not worthwhile to dwell upon.

Perhaps worthwhile is why the majority of Americans, like the majority of Russians, can't be bothered.  There are lots of negative pressures or personal failings we could assign as causes for how low people's interest & desire to participate is.  But still, this is America, the country that claims a unique history, tradition, and very identity with Democracy.  Moreover, this is the government that rules the land--that holds power of life and death over everyone ("a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence"), that decides peace & war, how much you'll have to pay in taxes or traffic fines, controls education, trade, abortion, infrastructure.  It's really important, and not just for "this election."

But my answer to the question of why so few Americans care to participate in what's regularly upheld as a hallmark of American-ness takes a different approach than a speculative weighing of the costs & benefits of expending the rather scant resources of time & energy to participate.  I'm interested in opportunity costs: what else are Americans doing with the small amount of time & effort that they could otherwise have spent on registering to vote, generating enough of an opinion to cast a vote, and then casting it?

They're doing much the same things Russians do: they're eating dinner, going grocery shopping, answering a friend's text, heading to work.  Often they're dealing with their kids, maybe watching TV, possibly working long hours, maybe at multiple jobs, or exhausted from doing the same.  They're trying to figure out which Costco account to sign up for; they're trying to get tenure; they're talking to their spouses or taking care of elderly relatives.  They're fixing their cars or mowing their lawns, or snapchatting with a potential hook-up.

They're engaged in their private sphere of social and economic activity--family & friends & career & household (including both work & entertainment).  These take up so much of most people's time & energy, that there's nothing left over for democracy, even though the bare minimum of voting takes very little effort, for most people.

This is certainly not true of everybody--after all, 60 million people did vote in the primaries, and an additional 60 million or so will probably vote in November; and many people go to school board meetings, or volunteer time for charity work.  But I'm not speaking of those people; I'm talking about the ones I can't get to register to vote.  Public-spiritedness may be alive and well in a fraction of the American population today, but that fraction is too small.  Indeed, at the last Congressional election in 2014, I know a number of political science professors who didn't bother to vote.  If educators within the very field of politics, responsible for the instauration in future generations of the values of our American democracy are too pre-occupied with trials and travails of their own private spheres to vote, there's a big problem in America.

The private sphere has been so valorized in America, and the fields of activity that contribute to private flourishing--education, career, kids, house, cars, nutrition, fitness, entertainment, insurance, tax-planning, retirement, vacation, health care--have undergone such hypertrophy in both their number, and more importantly, the imperatives of attending to them, that for the vast majority of Americans, there is no obligation to one's (or one's family's) private flourishing too small push out any activity undertaken in the public spirit.  Even among those with the most resources, who've gotten the best educations and high-paying jobs, we often congratulate ourselves for fulfilling the bare minimum requirement of democracy by merely voting.  The idea of stumping for candidates, volunteering time to register voters, or even running for office is barely conceivable to most of us--we're too busy to make democracy work.

One of the most pernicious catalysts of this problem is social media: facebook posts about politics and the election are a palliative for many people's pinches of conscience about participation (especially academics) that emotionally exempts us from the responsibility to actually do anything outside the virtual world that might make a real difference, to connect with the unengaged, or with people from different walks of life.

Now I'm sure that most people who post on facebook about how terrible this or that candidate is, or how desperate the stakes of the elections are, or how unjust are the agents of justice hired by our elected official, do almost always vote.  But we should see that as a  bare minimum.  Many give money, too, which does do something, but also alienates the donor's political responsibility onto some paid staffers somewhere, who are overworked & underpaid (often to an unconscionable, and now actually illegal degree, by Democratic no less than Republican candidates), usually undertrained, and often hamstrung by a lack of willing & able campaign volunteers.

If everybody who posts on facebook about politics spent an equal amount of time signing up new voters, phonebanking for the campaigns of the candidates who would address the injustices that bother them, or knocking doors to identify supporters & get out the vote, instead, we would go a long way towards making American democracy real, rather than the money-dominated, mass-media-manipulated, de-personalized and anti-community elitist affair it appears to so many to be.  I challenge everybody who reads this to catch yourself before you post or re-post something about the election, and instead spend those few seconds looking up how you can volunteer locally to register voters, or help your preferred candidate or party.  And then actually do the volunteering.  As I found out when registering voters this week--whether ex-felons or college students who didn't know they were eligible, it can be really uplifting and inspiring.

America & Russia: The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity

I challenge us all (myself included!), because we need it--we need our American democracy not to come to resemble Russia's.  Because there are those who want it to, the ones backing the presidential candidate who has lionized Russian president Vladimir Putin, although for the most part, they know not what they do.  This is one phenomenal inversion of the Russian case in America: if Russians are hesitant to stand up for change in the face of a poorly-performing autocracy because they know--and are afraid--of how much worse things can get, then a dangerously large swath of Americans are pushing for the destruction of our values and institutions because they don't know how good they have it.

It's true that in the past few decades, things have gotten worse for a lot of people in America.  Income inequality has gotten worse in this country, the jobs on offer are worse and less stable than they were before and the expenses most Americans face are harder to afford. Higher education seems more out of reach to many Americans than it used to be.  The solutions that America has used to address racism, crime, drugs, low-quality education, and deficit spending have evolved their own pathologies and problems.  But to submit the whole system to the guidance of someone like Donald Trump is to call for a leap into the abyss (I suspect I'm preaching to the choir for anyone likely to come across this blog).

If the 1990s are the reference-point for Russians, and as problematic as Russian society is today, they won't risk standing against injustice & corruption for fear of returning to that abyss, for Americans backing Trump, the reference-point is the imagined era when America was "great."  And the dark reflection of Trump supporters being so enamored by the force of anemoia (I had to look this up) that they will risk any amount of upheaval, corruption, and destruction offered by a sexist, violent, bullying, lying, arrogant, faithless, corrupt excuse for a businessman whose entire career has been devoted to swindling people, and whose only qualification to be leader of the free world is his celebrity, is a reality that would have been unthinkable in any previous era of American democracy.  (Ironically for the implicitly backward-looking slogan of his campaign, there is no way that someone as ethically bankrupt and devoted to private gain at the expense of other people and the public good could ever have come this close to the presidency in any historical era of American greatness he or his supporters might point to.)

Fortunately, those American voters so callous, foolish, and (in some significant proportion) undoubtedly racist enough to desire to loose Trump's blood-dimmed tide upon the world are not so numerous enough to overwhelm this nation.  They're only about 4% of our population, to judge from primary voting.  And yet 4% filled with passionate intensity may easily bully and bludgeon the rest of us into submission, if we continually show so little conviction as to spare no time from our "busy" schedules for any but the bare minimum of democratic participation.

We friends of justice, equality, and democracy may feel like the biggest enemies we are fighting are Trump, and racism, and the Koch brothers.  But the truth is that our biggest enemies are our own pre-occupations with the private sphere, our own fears that we will not flourish sufficiently if we don't devote almost every morsel of time & energy to our careers, families, children, homes, nutrition, etc.  I may feel good that I spent six hours registering voters this week, but that's the first real political action I've participated since the end of my stint with Bernie Sanders six months ago.  I've been as woefully reluctant to cut into my private sphere as anybody.

But from now on, I'll pledge not to.  I'll start with the next 17 days of voter registration here in Texas, but I won't let it end on November 8th.  Please join with me, pledge mutually, as did the fifty-six signatories twelve score years ago--whether you're already engaged in multiple public spheres and activities, or whether you like me have fallen submerged into the all-consuming private sphere, and want to turn over a new leaf--a real one, not just a virtual one.  Make some campaign calls!  Find out how to register voters in your area!  Knock on some doors for a candidate who will lead us higher up the mountain towards a more perfect union, rather than over a cliff into the abyss.  Leave a comment if you want, so I'll know you're with me, and have the conviction Yeats was so concerned for the lack of!

Sunday, September 4, 2016

Political is the Personal? Update from Texas!

No longer Virginia Jew 5159--now apparently I'm Texas Heathn 6247
Well, it's been a long eventful summer, and as Labor Day approaches, an overdue blog post emerges!

After spending most of June & July teaching economics at Piedmont Virginia Community College, I drove back to upstate New York where with the help of a good friend (Ed!), I packed most of Jasmine's & my earthly belongings out of another good friend's barn (Stephen!) and into a POD, which went hence to Texas ahead of (although ultimately behind) us.  Jasmine & I met up in South Jersey, where we left VJW 5158 at the old homestead, and then sallied forth across a number of states with a gill-filled CRV (and a cat burrowing his way through boxes, tote-bags, and other paraphernalia) first to Wisconsin, and ultimately here to Lubbock, Texas.

Our last stop before hitting our new home was Amarillo, where we enjoyed the Big Texan Steak Ranch, though I held myself to an 18 ouncer, and we got this swell bumper sticker, which joins Bernie on the back of the ol' CRV.

Now that I'm here, attached as a Visiting Instructor to the Texas Tech Political Science Department, I've got some interesting professional obligations.  One is to help write the online course content for the university's version of what the Texas Legislature calls "GOVT 2306 Texas Government (Texas constitution & topics)".  All Texas college students must take this course, which should involve the following "Learning Outcomes":
  • Explain the origin and development of the Texas constitution.
  • Describe state and local political systems and their relationship with the federal government.
  • Describe separation of powers and checks and balances in both theory and practice in Texas.
  • Demonstrate knowledge of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of Texas government.
  • Evaluate the role of public opinion, interest groups, and political parties in Texas.
  • Analyze the state and local election process.
  • Identify the rights and responsibilities of citizens.
  • Analyze issues, policies and political culture of Texas.
Basically, it's an area studies political science course about Texas!  And who better to develop the expertise & content for it than a comparativist who focuses on regional politics and loves to study BIG countries, like Russia, and Brazil, and now Texas!

I'm very excited for the endeavor, and hoping to fit in some politics, too, while I'm in the area--although it's been challenging so far to find much in the way of electoral activity to devote myself to.

Since the incumbent Republican congressman here is retiring, I thought perhaps it might be an momentous juncture in West Texas politics, as these are generally opportune moments for a challenger, especially a Democrat, in a presidential election year!  Apparently, though, it was not opportune enough of a moment, in the eyes of Democrats, to bother to put forward a candidate to run against former George W. Bush staffer & Texas Tech alum & former vice-chancellor Jodey Arrington.  At least, back in December of 2015, when the deadline for declaring candidacies passed, it didn't seem very opportune.  Thus, the Texas 19th is one of seven (out of 25) Republican-controlled districts where Democrats apparently went gentle into that good (?) night, without even "some dude" to present a token barrier to continued right-wing Congressional dominance.

But wait!  The Democratic party is hardly the only party of the left purports to stand against the conservative agenda!  The Green party apparently has a candidate in the race (at least according to Ballotpedia), although when I tried to find his web-site, the closest I got was a facebook page from 2014, and no response to my queries through it.

My next thought was to get involved in the Lubbock County Democratic Party, as a I had such a wonderful (if brief) experience with the open and diverse Albemarle County Democratic Party in Virginia during my all-too-short time as a resident there.  Alas, the Lubbock Democrats' online presence amounts to something called a "parse error: syntax error" and some other machine-speak--though a cached version of the site does yield a phone number.  I called and left a message with the Chair about a week and a half ago . . . no response yet.

We'll see what can be unearthed in terms of electoral activity here in Lubbock in the coming months, but I'm starting to get the sense that if Texan political culture ever does embrace competition at the ballot-box, it's not General Election day.  It may only be found in the primaries, where more than a half-century ago, it was only the Democratic primary that mattered, while today it may be only the Republican primary (and its run-off, which we missed by three months).

More updates coming soon!

Friday, July 1, 2016

Brexit & EU, Hillary & Trump, Obsessions with an "Alternate Reality"


Upset about Brexit

Since the people of Britain voted by a 4% margin to take the enormous cultural, economic, and geopolitical step of leaving the EU last week, my Facebook feed and daily news perusal has been deluged by lamentations.  Practically no sources I run across apparently find common cause with Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party and the most prominent generative force behind Brexit (or at least, none of them want to say so on Facebook).

Some of the lamentations are connected to the vote as a harbinger of a turn away from an open society; others are concerned about the racial-cultural backlash against the increasing number of inhabitants of the British Isles who are not as WASPy as those whose grandparents grew up there; and indeed others are gloomy about the economic fallout likely to damage the future of Britain, Europe, and maybe the world.  I found myself pretty sympathetic to these anxieties.

Brexit in UK = Trump in US?

Another trope of fear, however, was that somehow the narrow win for Brexit will prove to be a leading indicator or perhaps even a causal factor Donald Trump's incipient victory in the US presidential election this November.  I found myself less sympathetic to this direction of worried reasoning and added my own scrap of kindling to the Facebook fires by reminding to my friend that:

"The United States is not Britain,"

"A referendum is nothing like a presidential election (especially considering our country's Electoral College," and, most importantly,

"And Hillary Clinton is, I promise you, not the European Union," notwithstanding spite of any current conspiracy theories that she is no longer a human woman married to Bill Clinton, but rather a practically pan-European intergovernmental organization constituting 27 or 28 nation-states and run by bureaucrats out of the same place that used to administer the Belgian Congo (and with an eerily similar flag to that last and most brutal instance of colonial exploitation).

But seriously, aren't people mad at the establishment in similar ways on both sides of The Pond?

As against my dismissive Facebook response, there is an obvious and serious concern that the Brexit "phenomenon," which is now an electoral reality, emerges from the same kinds of dissatisfaction with the globalized pattern of increasing income inequality & stagnation that we see as strongly in the US:  The "haves" (whether they be the 1% or the the 30%)  have more & more, and the have-nots increasingly find that the storied economic mobility of free, capitalist democracies has gone the way of the cassette tape, disappearing sometime around the end of the last century.

In the end, though, patterns of party competition in this country, the Clinton campaign's advantage in financial and human resources (not quite as many bureaucrats as in Brussels, but almost), and the slow but steady dawning on more Americans that her fellow Democrat Barack Obama's stewardship of the White House has been a good thing, convince me of the position of Democratic strategist Doug Sosnik's analysis: "The 2016 election is already decided. History says Hillary Clinton wins."

The real problem: Nobody thought about the Possibility that became Reality

And yet, there is an important and upsetting similarity between Brexit & the US presidential election, though not so immediately dangerous one (at least, to my own normative view of the world).  That's the apparent broad obsession that people in politics, media, and indeed in their own conversations, have with dwelling upon, discussing, and opining about the way the world will not be the day after the vote.

In the long leadup to the Brexit vote, a lot of people were generally worried about Brexit, while in the last couple of days beforehand a few opinion polls showing that Brits would vote narrowly to "Remain" made people (especially financial trader people) increasingly confident that the next day, Britain would still have a future in the EU.

But it turned out otherwise, and indeed, it turned out that even the people leading the charge for Brexit had no idea what that would mean.  As a British friend of mine echoed on Facebook in the days since, "they had no plan."  In fact, now we have a state of reality where the British Prime Minister is a lame duck, the most prominent Brexit-promoter in his own party Boris Johnson (who'd been the odds-on favorite to succeed him) has pulled his hat out of the ring to be the next PM, and there's no certainty who will be the UK's leader in two months' time.  Moreover, nobody knows when the all-important Article 50 will be "triggered" to begin the formal negotiations on Britain's new status vis-Ă -vis the EU.  And to help matters, the UK's opposition party appears to be entering a slow-motion leadership struggle of its own with nobody quite certain who will succeed Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, and Corbyn himself refusing to go gentle into that good night even as the great majority of Labour MPs want him out.

This enormous degree of uncertainty about very important things--and the implicit the failure of powerful people, who have a lot to lose or gain, to have lined up support or come up with a plan of what to do if Brexit won seems to suggest that most British elites--and perhaps even most Brits--were so preoccupied by the way world would (as it turned out) not be the next morning (ie, they all just thought Britain would still be in the EU), they'd devoted little or none of their brainpower to what to do in the case that eventually prevailed as reality:  Where, in truth, can we see the "Reality Based Community" among Britain's leaders, media, or pundits in the run-up to Brexit?

Indeed, the fact that it was such a near vote in the end could perhaps partially excuse the apparent failure to consider "now what happens?" beforehand.  (Though it was also a near thing whether Hitler would have invaded the UK during WWII, or whether the US would confront a Soviet satellite 90 miles off the Florida coast during the Cold War--obviously the former didn't happen, and the latter did--but would it be forgivable if, respectively, UK & US leaders, media, & pundits failed to consider "what happens now" in the alternative of either of those scenarios?)

In the US, obsession with what probably won't become reality threatens to leave us, as a polity, as flat-footed as Brexit leaders

Now we begin to see the parallel with the United States.  For a long time, I personally had been really hoping that the reality this coming November 9th would be Bernie Sanders headed to the Oval Office.  I had to give that up several weeks ago, and join what now appears to be the Reality Based Community that his opponent will quite probably be the president-elect.

But that's a hard to community in which to find any conversation--most of the news media (2/3 of WaPo's front page this morning, 3/4 of Bloomberg Politics, and almost all of NYT's political coverage) are preoccupied with the man who will mostly likely not be elected president, as they and have been unswervingly for the past twelve months.

Even a couple of weeks ago when I attended the Democratic Party of Virginia's state Convention in Richmond, state party leaders from Governor Terry McAuliffe to our Democratic congressmen, down to the merest party functionaries allowed on stage spent far more time talking about Donald Trump than about Hillary Clinton--they even made us watch a video of the most appalling things he's said (as if Democratic delegates were likely to be uninformed about him).  A few people said they loved Bernie (though the tokenism of the comment was as bald as Yul Brynner), and lectured us on how important it was to get Hillary elected, but nobody said anything about what policies she would put in place in the (quite likely real future) even of her being elected president.

And try finding anything from prominent news outlets about what life will be like in America where Hillary Clinton is president--you'll need magnifying glasses and forensic training.  I don't doubt a Hillary will generally undertake policies that I, as a Democrat, would favor, and she's not trying to keep her plans or their details a secret, by any means.  But somehow, almost nobody in the Public Sphere seems inclined to discuss what the next Clinton presidency will be like.  And those who do want to talk about it are mostly wanting tell us how horrible it will be, for example, to have the country run by criminals.

Is this dangerous?  In this particular case, I doubt it--I think the reality we'll be living in starting November 9th will probably be as good as can be expected from the American political system.

But in general, the propensity for us--especially our media & leaders--to ignore in public discourse the way the world really is (or is likely to be) in favor of what is less likely to actually prevail in reality (in the event, Brexit), or even what is fantastical (Donald Trump's presidency), is a huge problem.  I'll forbear speculating on the root of it, but it's something that must change if we're not to be caught as flat-footed by major (and often predictable) world events (climate change comes to mind most quickly, but it's hardly the one!) as Brexit's leaders have been by getting what they wanted!

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

The Republican Party--still a party? (Response to Jenkins & Heersink)

Today in the Monkey Cage, Jeffrey Jenkins & Boris Heersink invoke John Aldrich (Why Parties? Chicago UP, 1995) to demonstrate a phenomenon perhaps in need of explanation: how unusual (& risky) it is for Republican leaders to actually go against party by rejecting the candidate their own voters & rules have selected to be their presidential nominee.

Taking their observation to the next level--explanation--leads first through the common wisdom that Republican leaders see the short-term costs of threatening party unity as less than the medium-term costs of tightening their and their party's association with someone as terrible as Trump.  Of course, the Republican leaders could be wrong, since it might weaken or break apart the party in the long-term.  But a debate about the accuracy of their estimates according to this superficial-level explanation of why this is happening misses another direction the argument could take.

Indeee, a more illuminating explanation emerges from a deeper consideration of Aldrich, the meaning of "political parties" as entities, and the contemporary Republican party

Jenkins & Heersink wisely follow Aldrich in identifying parties as "long coalitions," constituted to bind together legislative voting blocs together and secure the votes of not just those who really want  any given policy, but a few others, as well, enough to win policy changes; while every given policy change may displease a small fraction of the party members, it will be a different fraction each time, and most members will get mostly the policy changes they want over time--and far more frequently than if each member were alone, without a stable "long coalition."

But this view of parties depends on the assumption that a) the party's leaders & elected officials actually want the government to do a set of things it's not currently doing, and thus change policy to enact that, and b) want a coherent-enough set of things that they can encapsulate it what Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper, 1957) would call an "ideology."  We today would probably just call it a party program, or set of ideals.

But the Republican party today seems united not by what they want the government to do, but only what they want it not to do, which seems to be almost everything.  For example, the party doesn't even seem to want the government to enforce the very tax laws that enable it collect the revenue to fund its activities.  Everything the Republican party desires seems to involve wanting the government to reduce or eliminate its activities, with regard to enforcing equality, maintaining infrastructure, promoting education, managing the macroeconomy, providing health care, health insurance, and ensuring retirement income, guaranteeing the rights of minority communities to full participation in society.

This amounts to an easy coalition to hold together in the long run, since it wants to do nothing, even with the ill-feelings that may come from division over the party's presidential nominee.  Republican leaders may be quite right that they will pay little cost in the next (Democratic) presidential term's legislative & electoral battles for not supporting Donald Trump: who among them would abandon their party's only universally shared tenet of "let's let nothing happen" in order to actually participate in something happening?  Certainly not anything that's likely to happen under a Democratic president.  Voters & gerrymandering have locked in the electoral benefit of this thinnest of ideological glue.

Anthony Downs defined a political party as an organization that seeks "to control the governing apparatus by legal means," specifically the means of "duly constituted elections."  But the Republican party, it seems, would prefer that apparatus not to exist at all, rather than try to control it.

It's true that actually undoing government altogether, especially eliminating entitlement-based programs or Federal taxation, would actually require a set of positive legislation to be passed (& signed), rather than just blocking policy enactment.

But herein lies the open secret of the Republican party's shared goal (too thin to be called an "ideology"): they don't seem to very strongly desire even those claimed reductions in government to come about--they're happy to simply keep the status quo, with some slow erosion.  This stance of talking a big talk, but actually just keeping government as it is (or slightly lesser) seems to work for the individual electoral goals of Republicans at every level, except the presidency.

And we can see that the Republican party leadership doesn't seem to really want to control the presidency.  If it did, it would, as a collective group, have gotten involved in presidential politics (in this or other cycles) by prodding stronger candidates to run, or picking one of the strongest candidates it had and really working for that candidate from the beginning.  (The Democratic party leadership, by contrast, has been quite hands-on about presidential races for the last several cycles.)

So Republican party leaders are indeed, as Jenkins & Heersink claim, acting contrary to the foundational logic of political parties.  This could weaken the party, or presage its breaking up (as happened to its predecessor, the Whig Party, a century and a half ago).

Or, it could indicate that the Republican party is simply no longer a "normal" political party, according to classical definitions.

It's instead a kind of mutant entity that calls itself a party, but has no programmatic goals or true desire to control the governing apparatus (akin to the party-like entities  that Schattchneider, 1942, calls "pressure groups" or "minor parties," but which don't really act like parties).

Such entities are common, and frequently call themselves "parties," even as the raisons d'ĂȘtre that hold them together are something else, like self-enrichment, office-holding for the sake of immunity from prosecution, serving a particular client or client-class, or something else that takes priority over gaining control of the government by means of duly constituted elections.

If this is true, the Republican party finds itself in the company of  Brazil's PMDB, Vladimir Putin's United Russia, and Chinese Communist Party, all of which prioritize other goals than what democratic political parties are all about.

Friday, April 15, 2016

For Bernie, we win via the High Road, not Harassment

Bernie Sanders is my candidate for president, and what I have put into his campaign evidences that no one is more devoted to his cause than I am.

But among my brothers and sisters working for the political revolution, a disturbing trend has grown, and there need to be more voices coming out against it: the heavy dose of bitter vitriol mixed with the elixir of revolution that we offer to America.  Venom will never lead us to victory.

The most recent incident: "SuperdelegateHitList.com" (since changed to SuperdelegateList.com) created by Chicago Activist Spencer Thayer, whose invitational tweet asked  “So who wants to help start . . . a new website aimed at harassing Democratic Superdelegates?”  (WaPo).  Thayer has since responded to the storm of criticism (including tales of late-night threatening calls to the homes of Hillary-declared superdelegates creeping out the likes of 12 year-olds answering the phone) by removing the word "Hit" from the name of the site, as well as publicly encouraging people to be polite in their lobbying of Superdelegates.

But the words "Harassing" and "Hit" at the moment conception cast the die, because there's no second chance to make a first impression.  And among the ranks of my fellow Bernie supporters, Thayer is not alone in words & actions that utilize vinegar rather than honey in engaging those who aren't already Bernie supporters.  Examples abound on social media, like this one I saw this morning:
Addressing one's audience as "idiots" is not the best recipe for making converts out of doubters.  Now, whoever generated this meme probably imagines that the real targets of conversion are not actually the purported addressees of the meme, but the bitter, outraged pugnacity with which this and other pro-Bernie messages are often suffused only fuels an impression that our ranks are filled only with acerbic aggression, sullen complaint, and outraged animosity--not to mention the image (mirage?) of sexist "Bernie Bros" that has grown like a cancer on the public face of the political revolution.  Perhaps it's unfair, but politics is about perception--and we supporters of Bernie need to work on ours (which is not true of the candidate himself).

One of the important roots of this is anxiety, and the accompanying paranoia, from a perception that the deck is stacked against Bernie, and institutions and people (embattled DNC chair Debbie Wasserman-Schultz most frequently cited) that in fairness ought to be neutral are actually tipping the scales corruptly against our candidate.

Anxiety & paranoia, added to what has seemed to some of us like a media blackout, or pig-pile on Bernie, has been brewing a stew of nasty emotions that have emerged in all the ways mentioned above, and this is dangerous for two reasons: 1) our movement won't grow if we lead with negativity, and 2) a serious, nasty new rift on our side of the political spectrum may lead the Left in general to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in November.

So we who want Bernie to be president should not only avoid such negative tactics, but denounce them.  We should not trumpet a "Bernie or Bust" position (which I disagree with strongly, but which position I can understand).  Expressing that is not going to help Bernie win any more primaries, and may very well drive away Democrats who are on the fence about our candidate.

After last night's debate, one telling observation in the media was that "Both candidates would do well to understand that vehemence is not a substitute for substance."

If that's true of the candidates, it's vastly more true for us, the armies of the political revolution.  Neither Superdelegates nor primary voters will be won over by harassment, vitriol, or complaints.  And Bernie will not win without winning over people who aren't already in his corner.

Not all, but a great swath of those voting for Hillary are voting for her only because they think she can win in November.  They've heard Bernie's platform--and most like it--but Bernie needs to prove he can win, and we need to help, not hinder.  Superdelegates, especially, are looking more than anything to bank on a winner, and they will come over to Bernie, if he & we can convince them he's a winner.

And we can.

As of now, Bernie has won fewer overall votes (a misleading metric because of the differences between primaries & caucuses), fewer pledged delegates (1,307 to 1,087), and fewer states (18 to 16).

But that can change in the next 11 days.  If Bernie wins the New York primary, and then can be seen to have won the flurry of primaries on April 26 (PA & MD are the big prizes, but CT, DE, and RI are also voting then), Bernie can cut into the pledged delegate count, and perhaps more meaningfully, as a symbol, move ahead in the number of states won.

It is metrics like these that will make Superdelegates sit up and take notice--even those who've already committed themselves to Hillary.  And so if we want to bring them over to Bernie, working to get Bernie the win in those six states in the next 11 days should be our priority.

Bernie wins elections--and Superdelegates--with honor, not harassment; with goodwill, not grievance. By May--and certainly by June, after victory in the California primary--Bernie will have a good case to make to the Superdelegates, and we'll be ready to help in whatever way he needs.  But until then, we who want Bernie will only be undermining his cause if we focus on "hit-lists," complaints, and the kind of off-putting protestations of unfairness that will draw no one to our cause.

Monday, April 4, 2016

The Unexamined Roots of the Case for Trade: More stuff is always better

International trade has been growing as a point of contention since the Trans-Pacific Partnership arrived in the public sphere a year ago, and has become increasingly prominent in the US presidential primaries. But lost in discussions about who gets hurt who is exploiting whom is a critical perspective on the central benefit of free trade: cheaper access to consumer goods.

The discussion of the effects of trade is simple to conceive of as a back-and-forth:
  • + Trade Case: Comparative Advantage!  If we can Product A more efficiently than Product B, and another country makes Product B more efficiently, then it makes more sense to make a lot of Product A, sell it to the other country, and buy Product B from them cheaper than we could make it ourselves. We'll spend less money to get the same or of both Products than if we made everything at home.
  • - Trade response: but when we start importing Product B instead if making it in America, all those good people at Product B factories lose their jobs!
  • + Trade Response #1: but if we've got more trade overall, more people get jobs at Product A factories, so it balances out.
  • + Trade Response #2: plus, the more trade we've got, the more efficiently everything is being produced and consumed, so we can afford more Products of every kind.
  • - Trade argument, at this point, usually devolves into demonizing foreigners who are "taking" the jobs of workers in Product B factories, or something about national pride, along with suspicious attempts to portray Product B factory workers as more truly "American" because of their blue-collar status, and thus more worthy of our protection--or else more well-founded targeting of the increasing profits that accrue from trade to the owners of capital.
Ultimately, though, economists and politicians defending more trade (often rolled into "globalization") are able to carry the argument not by parrying these points, but upon the seemingly unassailable Response #2, that the broad benefits for all outweigh the costs of the few who lose their jobs.  This utilitarian, even possibly socialist logic of "the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few" (Spock, or Jeremy Bentham?) is hard to argue against, which helps explain why the other side goes of into other types of counter-arguments.

But while the logic may be sound, the assumptions that underlie it deserve scrutiny.  What exactly is this broad benefit of trade that accrues to all?  Binyamin Applebaum (NYT) distills it as "Everyone gets a discount," while Thomas Black & Isabella Cota (Bloomberg) unpack slighlty more "the benefits of the surge of cheap imports, primarily subdued inflation that preserves consumers' purchasing power."

More and more access to cheaper physical things is the great benefit that trade provides--and indeed, if we can buy a TV from China for $300 instead of $600, are we not better off?  If we can afford to buy farm-raised shrimp from Southeast Asia for $6.99/lb instead of paying $12.99/lb for shrimp caught in the Gulf of Mexico, don't we have access to a better life?

The central benefit of trade depends on the refusal to posit that the answer to these questions might be "no".

But if we examine the lives of genuinely struggling Americans, facing poverty, joblessness, and the inability to climb up even the lowest rungs of the economic ladder, are these problems connected to constrained access to cheap goods and food? Is clothing too expensive? Cell phones? TVs? No: lots of families are trapped in cycles of poverty, but not because there is too little cheap stuff on offer to American consumers. Quality housing, less exploitative legal systems,  safe neighborhoods, and better-resourced schools are lacking, but those cannot be imported.

And what if we examine the lives of Americans in the precarious middle-class? It may be that the latest smartphone or tablet is more accessible because of trade with China, and new school clothes and fall fashions are more affordable because they come from factories in Bangladesh or Mexico. But the speedier integration of new technologies into the expected consumer basket has also loaded families with new expenses: your cable-internet package with all the right channels and download speeds to accommodate streaming over multiple devices may cost 6-7 times what you paid for cable in the 1980s, but incomes have not kept pace. And your family plan for smartphones is a new monthly bill altogether that 1990s budgets weren't forced to juggle. Indeed, many blessings of the "surge of cheap imports" come with monthly service charges that load expense onto services that cannot be replaced by trade (cell phone service cannot be imported), so are we economically better off?

A deeper problem is this: the access to lots more cheap imported goods has enormously expanded the potential participants and arenas of the most dangerous game in capitalism: "Keeping up with the Joneses." Conspicuous Consumption (Thorstein Veblen) is on the rise in reaches of the American income spectrum where it would have been simply unthinkable a half century ago, and in realms of consumption then not even imaginable: which G of iPhone do you have? What store do you buy your organic baby food at? Do you get the free version of Spotify or do you pay for Pandora?

Conspicuous Consumption, as a concept, is an enormous challenge to the basic assumptions upon which argument for trade rests. More trade is good if we are always only spending money on something that really makes our lives better, and thus, if any given thing we can get is cheaper, our lives are better because we can have more of it, or more of something else we otherwise couldn't afford that will make our lives better.

Conspicuous Consumption is the idea that due to social constructions of power and the fear of feeling inadequate (not to mention the power of marketing to get us to spend money on things that do not make our lives better), a lot of our spending is not driven by well-informed decisions about what we really want, need, or will make our lives better, but rather is wasted on things we're bamboozled into buying--many of which may make our lives much worse.

In the end, if trade's main benefit to "the many" has been expanding their capacity to buy more and more cheap goods that often do not make our lives better, but frequently make them more cluttered, expensive, and unhealthy, then the logical structure buttressing the “broad benefits” of trade falls away.

Friday, March 18, 2016

The Supreme Court, Legislative Obstructionism, and Presidential Dictatorship

Before commentary, a bit of recent personal history: from December 28th through the Virginia Democratic Primary (March 1st, Super Tuesday), I was employed by Bernie 2016, my main goal since leaving my position as an Assistant Professor at Colgate nearly a year ago.  I was the Field Organizer (lowest rung of the ladder) for "V1D," an area of Virginia centered in Charlottesville, where Jasmine & I moved at the end of last summer, and including a huge swath of 16 surrounding counties.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.  I did a huge amount of work, I learned a huge amount about campaigns and campaign work in the trenches, met hundreds of wonderful volunteers, and saw lots of parts of Virginia that I never otherwise would have seen.  In the end, Bernie lost the Virginia primary by 29%, but in V1D turf, he only lost by 3%, and we won 7 of the 17 counties (in all, Bernie won 15 out of Virginia's 143 counties) in the turf.  My volunteers did an amazing job.  I was super-exhausted by the end of my "deployment," which lasted a week or so after the primary campaign itself.  During my employment, as a functionary of the Bernie Campaign, I could not blog, or even comment much on facebook, since I'd be seen as an official representative the campaign--even if I were blogging about something totally unrelated (as I am today).

Now, however, that I am no longer professionally attached to Bernie 2016, I am free to present my opinions again.
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Juan Linz wrote in the 1990s of the "Perils of Presidentialism," that in democracies where power is increasingly centered in a directly elected executive, there is a great danger of instability, and also of presidents taking on so much authority that democracy is seriously threatened.  Guillermo O'Donnell had similar worries over "Delegative Democracy," a version of a democracy where the one-shot election of a chief executive (the moment of "delegation" by the people) was seen as so centrally decisive that all parts of the system waited for their decisions on that single mandate every half-decade or so.  If and when, during the course of his or her term, such a president came informally to be seen as a lame duck, no business could get done until another president took over.  If a country faced a crisis during such a period, but nobody thought the sitting president carried the mantle of mandate to take dramatic steps, the country would languish in crisis with the looming threat of extra-constitutional methods of getting a new president "early."

Both of these worries imply a legislature where nothing important can be decided, which cannot originate policy or act as a political agent and "first-mover," but must merely re-act to whatever the super-empowered executive does.  How a legislature comes to be so weak and vestigial is an important question.  In some cases, especially in very new democracies, an incredibly weak or "rubber-stamp" legislature is written into the constitution.  But all constitutions are "living documents," and the informal patterns and traditions that grow up are more powerful than the written rules themselves.

In the United States, the oldest and most vibrant democracy in the world, we are seeing a pattern of legislative-executive interaction that promotes this vestigialization of the legislature, and ironically, it is emerges from the legislature itself, and in particular from the party that opposes the president.

In an interview from October 23rd, 2010, then Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell claimed that the most important thing his party could achieve would be to make Barack Obama a one-term president.  This quote has gotten plenty of air-time as evidence of how terribly recalcitrant McConnell and the Republican Party are, of their prioritizing political victory over the nation's business, of the mindlessness of their opposition to our country's first African-American president.

But in hindsight, it's more than that: it is an indicator of the party's acceptance of the proposition that no policy change can happen in a way that it desires unless it holds the presidency: the soon-to-be Tea Party wave sweeping Republicans into the majority in the House would not give Republicans leverage enough to work with Obama to get something they wanted out of negotiated policies, nor would the 2014 takeover of the Senate.

The Republican Party has shown that no matter how much power it has in the legislature, it expects to get zero done while a Democrat sits in the White House.  The party would rather shut down the government, perhaps drive the country into loan default (hardly a "fiscally responsible" move), and obstruct any major legislation than use its legislative power to get something out working together with a Democratic president.

Nowhere is this self-minimization of the legislative branch more evident than in the response to the president's nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court.  We now see the next shoe dropping in the path the Republican party has put us on to a delegative democracy, like those O'Donnell saw unfolding in the early 1990s in places like PerĂș, Venezuela, and Russia: 

The Republican leader apparently goes beyond accepting the idea that a legislative majority cannot fruitfully initiate new policy, or cooperate with a president from the other party, but even a presdient with over 20% of his term remaining is not endowed with a mandate to fulfill his constitutional duty of nominating someone to fill a vacancy in the judicial branch.  And indeed, when we consider the huge backlog of judicial and even executive branch appointments that the Republicans have stalled through Obama's two (count 'em: 2!) terms in office, we see that perhaps in the mind of Republican leaders, only at the very beginning of a four-year term in office does enough "delegative" authority attach to the president, from winning a quadrennial election, to actual carry out any policy change or appoint key figures as required by the constitution.

The Republican agenda of the last six years has made frightening progress in establishing new patterns and traditions in America's democracy: a legislature cannot fruitfully initiate new policy or even work with an executive to make headway on the policy goals of its members if it faces a president from a different party; and now, a president should not even fulfill the duties a constitution charges him or her with if a new election looms within a year (or more?).  

Regardless of who is elected as president in the fall of 2016, these patterns, if they become institutionalized, will endow that person with a terrifying degree of informal mandate come January 20, 2017, since there will be so much waiting for his or her attention, and the tacit acceptance that nothing can be decided before that day will put everything in his or her hands--probably much more than ought to be.  Moreover, unless the legislature is controlled by the same party, the pattern would make us expect merely war and stalemate between legislature and executive until Jan 20, 2021, when we'll have a new president (unless we impeach the one elected in 2016).  And finally, regardless of legislative or executive party control, this new pattern would make us expect no government action at all after a certain honeymoon period in the new president's term.  How long will that period be?  2 years?  Should we expect it to even last until the campaigns for the 2018 midterm election get under way?  100 days?

The United States is the oldest and most stable democracy in the world--it also happens to be my favorite.  But the patterns and informal institutions set in place by Republican reactions to the presidency of Barack Obama threaten to make it unrecognizable a decade from now--and perhaps no more a democracy than places like Venezuela and Russia.