Showing posts with label presidential campaign. Show all posts
Showing posts with label presidential campaign. Show all posts

Saturday, November 5, 2016

Keep Calm & Don't let FiveThirtyEight get to you this weekend!

Or: how I learned to stop worrying and love the election.

If you're like me, and most Democrats, or just people who agree with my friend's facebook encapsulation: "You cannot be for Trump and for common decency," you may be spending this weekend freaking out each time you refresh Nate Silver's prediction website and see Hillary's chance of winning the election declining by a fraction of a percentage point.

But as a political scientist & specialist on elections & parties--as well as a junkie of this election, and a dab hand at quantitative analysis in politics, I wanted to share a few observations that I hope might help preserve some people's arterial walls in the next three days.

Here are three big reasons why the closer we get to the election, the less sense this seemingly precipitous decline seems to make (and, keep in mind, Mr. Silver & co would still say the chances of Hillary winning are almost double what Trump's are):

  1. Math of the electoral college: Hillary Clinton could lose Florida, Nevada, Iowa, & Ohio (that Obama won), plus North Carolina, where she's been ahead in polling (and which Obama won in 2008), and still be president, as long as she wins Pennsylvania & New Hampshire (last won by a Republican in 1988 & 2000, respectively--are Keystone & Granite staters really going to let you-know-who lure them over to the Republican side after having turned their noses up at more respectable Republicans like Mitt Romney, John McCain, and the Bush family?)
  2. Early voting doesn't seem to have a meaningful place in Silver's forecast model, and in two of Trump's must-win states, the story for the Republican looks much grimmer than Silver's outcast predicts:
    • Nevada, which Silver's projections give Trump a 50.5-51.1% chance of winning, seems like a lock for Hillary, considering early voting, which ended there yesterday.  Probably at least two thirds of all votes that will be cast in the state have already been cast, and 73,000 more Democrats have cast ballots than Republicans.  In 2012, Obama won Nevada by about 68,000 votes (a comfortable, if not huge 6.5% margin), after Dem-registered voters cast 71,000 more early votes than Republicans did.  So Hillary is farther ahead of Trump in Nevada than Obama was ahead of Mitt Romney (the first Mormon candidate--NV's electorate has one of the largest Mormon blocs after UT).  To imagine that Trump actually has a slightly better chance of winning Nevada than Hillary now is to imagine a rather preposterous degree of uncertainty in what will happen on Nov 8.
    • In Florida, Democrat-registered voters have a lead in early voting, too, although it doesn't compare nearly as well with 2012.  They lead by just about 7,000 votes, as opposed to 104,000 four years ago, when Obama won the state by just 74,000 votes.  Of course, if that were the only info we had, that difference of 97,000 votes is more than enough to erase Obama's final margin.  But from Florida, we also have information about the ethnicity of early voters, and the big change in Florida this year is the huge growth in the Latino vote: although early voting is still going on today, as of yesterday, Latinos had cast nearly 600,000 early votes, or 14% of all early votes (compared to just 300,000 in 2008--the last year with comparable data, when Obama won Florida by 240,000 votes).  In 2012, Latinos accounted for less than 10% of early votes, on their way to account for 17% of all votes in the state that year.
      And this year, there are a lot more Latino voters in Florida, and most of the newcomers are US citizens from Puerto Rico (who lean Democrat, as opposed to the stereotypical Cuban-Floridian voter, who leans Republican), while the total number of white-only voters in the state has declined has declined by 1.5% from 2012.
      While the early voting picture in Florida is not as contradictory to the idea of Trump winning the state as in Nevada, Silver's projection of Trump with a 52.4-53.3% chance of winning the state should not make us simply cast it on Trump's pile in our mental electoral-college maps
    • I could go on with similar stories about places like Arizona, Iowa, and North Carolina where already-in early-voting numbers that aren't built into Silver's model tell a much more hopeful story for Hillary than the numbers on Silver's map (Trump with a 74.1-76.1% chance in AZ, 68.7-70.0% in IA, and 51.7-53.7% in NC), but more meaningful is an investigation of how the model's calculations are currently "grade-inflating" Trump's polling numbers in states across the country.
  3. Head-scratching aspect of the FiveThirtyEight model: One big part of Silver's calculation of the final vote-estimate is based on how much each state's vote-outcome correlates with with national polls.  A big part of this is the trend-line adjustment that Silver adds on top of his polling averages for each state.  That is to say: if a candidate seems to have gained in national polls in the past weeks or months, then Silver's model if the polls in a given state haven't moved much in the period, those state polls must be under-counting that candidate's likely final vote outcome.
    The upshot is that in calculating the current estimates (estimates, we should hasten to emphasize, as Silver would) of the final-outcome vote shares, which he then uses for his percent-chance calculations, Silver's model adds on some "missing" voters for Trump to whatever the adjust poll averages say: about a 2% "bonus" for Trump across all the states.
    Thus, if the polling average (adjusted for the partisan leans of the polls) in, for example:
    • NH is 43.9-40% (Clinton +3.9%), the "Trend Line Adjusted" average is 43.9-41.9% (Clinton +2%).
    • OH is 42.8-43.2% (Trump +0.4%), the TLA avg is 43.0-45.6% (Trump +2.6%)
    • NC is 45.5-43.6% (Clinton +1.9%), the TLA avg is 45.3-45.5% (Trump +0.2%)

      Thus,
      Trump's projected chances in all these races are much higher than if Silver didn't believe all the state-poll averages were under-counting Trump.  NH looks much tighter for Clinton, OH looks like a decent lead for Trump, rather than a neck-and-neck, and NC looks neck-and-neck for Trump, rather than a tight lead for Clinton.  While this built-in calculation of the model might normally make sense, the yawning 2% Trump bonus that the current set of polls produces for it seems way too big to bank on.

      Now
      , maybe the all these state polls really are "missing" the "Trump-bump" that Silver's calculations find in the national polls, but I find big (cardiac-muscle-saving) solace in doubting that these and other well-polled states are all under-counting Trump's final strength, come Tuesday night.
In conclusion, although I know lots of people who love FiveThirtyEight's statistical sophistication and history of good predictions (though not Trump's primary victory!), but justifiably fear a Trump presidency, may be freaking out this weekend, There are three big reasons we should all step back from our windowsills & balconies: 1) Democratic Electoral College advantages that mean Trump would have to be the best Republican candidate in 30 years to win. 2) Early-voting info that seems to confound the polling predictions.  3) The fact that the polling predictions are based on an assumed under-counting of Trump's support in all the state polls.

A final big reason to breathe easy is organization: The Clinton campaign has something like four times as many people organizing Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) phone banks, door-knocking, and other activities as the Trump campaign does.  And they have been at it longer.  Clinton's side began staffing up in swing states 7-8 months ago, building lists of volunteers to door-knock the data-chosen voters, networks of civil-society allies, and armies of organizers (including some great vets of Bernie's campaign!) to make it all happen.  Trump has nothing like this, and the Republican party has barely been scrambling in just the past month or two to come up with some semblance of ground game, and fallen far short.  Having been out there for months for Bernie, and known dozens if not hundreds of others who've done that, and also who are out for Hillary, this matters.  Not enough to create a swamping landslide, but by enough (2-4%?) in a close election like this that it should hearten us.

So we should all Keep Calm, and Carry on--and direct any restless energy we might have into some GOTV calling!

Keep Calm & Don't let FiveThirtyEight get to you this weekend!

Or: how I learned to stop worrying and love the election.

If you're like me, and most Democrats, or just people who agree with my friend's facebook encapsulation: "You cannot be for Trump and for common decency," you may be spending this weekend freaking out each time you refresh Nate Silver's prediction website and see Hillary's chance of winning the election declining by a fraction of a percentage point.

But as a political scientist & specialist on elections & parties--as well as a junkie of this election, and a dab hand at quantitative analysis in politics, I wanted to share a few observations that I hope might help preserve some people's arterial walls in the next three days.

Here are three big reasons why the closer we get to the election, the less sense this seemingly precipitous decline seems to make (and, keep in mind, Mr. Silver & co would still say the chances of Hillary winning are almost double what Trump's are):

  1. Math of the electoral college: Hillary Clinton could lose Florida, Nevada, Iowa, & Ohio (that Obama won), plus North Carolina, where she's been ahead in polling (and which Obama won in 2008), and still be president, as long as she wins Pennsylvania & New Hampshire (last won by a Republican in 1988 & 2000, respectively--are Keystone & Granite staters really going to let you-know-who lure them over to the Republican side after having turned their noses up at more respectable Republicans like Mitt Romney, John McCain, and the Bush family?)
  2. Early voting doesn't seem to have a meaningful place in Silver's forecast model, and in two of Trump's must-win states, the story for the Republican looks much grimmer than Silver's outcast predicts:
    • Nevada, which Silver's projections give Trump a 50.5-51.1% chance of winning, seems like a lock for Hillary, considering early voting, which ended there yesterday.  Probably at least two thirds of all votes that will be cast in the state have already been cast, and 73,000 more Democrats have cast ballots than Republicans.  In 2012, Obama won Nevada by about 68,000 votes (a comfortable, if not huge 6.5% margin), after Dem-registered voters cast 71,000 more early votes than Republicans did.  So Hillary is farther ahead of Trump in Nevada than Obama was ahead of Mitt Romney (the first Mormon candidate--NV's electorate has one of the largest Mormon blocs after UT).  To imagine that Trump actually has a slightly better chance of winning Nevada than Hillary now is to imagine a rather preposterous degree of uncertainty in what will happen on Nov 8.
    • In Florida, Democrat-registered voters have a lead in early voting, too, although it doesn't compare nearly as well with 2012.  They lead by just about 7,000 votes, as opposed to 104,000 four years ago, when Obama won the state by just 74,000 votes.  Of course, if that were the only info we had, that difference of 97,000 votes is more than enough to erase Obama's final margin.  But from Florida, we also have information about the ethnicity of early voters, and the big change in Florida this year is the huge growth in the Latino vote: although early voting is still going on today, as of yesterday, Latinos had cast nearly 600,000 early votes, or 14% of all early votes (compared to just 300,000 in 2008--the last year with comparable data, when Obama won Florida by 240,000 votes).  In 2012, Latinos accounted for less than 10% of early votes, on their way to account for 17% of all votes in the state that year.
      And this year, there are a lot more Latino voters in Florida, and most of the newcomers are US citizens from Puerto Rico (who lean Democrat, as opposed to the stereotypical Cuban-Floridian voter, who leans Republican), while the total number of white-only voters in the state has declined has declined by 1.5% from 2012.
      While the early voting picture in Florida is not as contradictory to the idea of Trump winning the state as in Nevada, Silver's projection of Trump with a 52.4-53.3% chance of winning the state should not make us simply cast it on Trump's pile in our mental electoral-college maps
    • I could go on with similar stories about places like Arizona, Iowa, and North Carolina where already-in early-voting numbers that aren't built into Silver's model tell a much more hopeful story for Hillary than the numbers on Silver's map (Trump with a 74.1-76.1% chance in AZ, 68.7-70.0% in IA, and 51.7-53.7% in NC), but more meaningful is an investigation of how the model's calculations are currently "grade-inflating" Trump's polling numbers in states across the country.
  3. Dubious aspect of the FiveThirtyEight model: One big part of Silver's calculation of the final vote-estimate is based on how much each state's vote-outcome correlates with with national polls.  A big part of this is the trend-line adjustment that Silver adds on top of his polling averages for each state.  That is to say: if a candidate seems to have gained in national polls in the past weeks or months, then Silver's model if the polls in a given state haven't moved much in the period, those state polls must be under-counting that candidate's likely final vote outcome.
    The upshot is that in calculating the current estimates (estimates, we should hasten to emphasize, as Silver would) of the final-outcome vote shares, which he then uses for his percent-chance calculations, Silver's model adds on some "missing" voters for Trump to whatever the adjust poll averages say: about a 2% "bonus" for Trump across all the states.
    Thus, if the polling average (adjusted for the partisan leans of the polls) in, for example:
    • NH is 43.9-40% (Clinton +3.9%), the "Trend Line Adjusted" average is 43.9-41.9% (Clinton +2%).
    • OH is 42.8-43.2% (Trump +0.4%), the TLA avg is 43.0-45.6% (Trump +2.6%)
    • NC is 45.5-43.6% (Clinton +1.9%), the TLA avg is 45.3-45.5% (Trump +0.2%)

      Thus,
      Trump's projected chances in all these races are much higher than if Silver didn't believe all the state-poll averages were under-counting Trump.  NH looks much tighter for Clinton, OH looks like a decent lead for Trump, rather than a neck-and-neck, and NC looks neck-and-neck for Trump, rather than a tight lead for Clinton.  While this built-in calculation of the model might normally make sense, the yawning 2% Trump bonus that the current set of polls produces for it seems way too big to bank on.

      Now
      , maybe the all these state polls really are "missing" the "Trump-bump" that Silver's calculations find in the national polls, but I find big (cardiac-muscle-saving) solace in doubting that these and other well-polled states are all under-counting Trump's final strength, come Tuesday night.
In conclusion, although I know lots of people who love FiveThirtyEight's statistical sophistication and history of good predictions (though not Trump's primary victory!), but justifiably fear a Trump presidency, may be freaking out this weekend, There are three big reasons we should all step back from our windowsills & balconies: 1) Democratic Electoral College advantages that mean Trump would have to be the best Republican candidate in 30 years to win. 2) Early-voting info that seems to confound the polling predictions.  3) The fact that the polling predictions are based on an assumed under-counting of Trump's support in all the state polls.

A final big reason to breathe easy is organization: The Clinton campaign has something like four times as many people organizing Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) phone banks, door-knocking, and other activities as the Trump campaign does.  And they have been at it longer.  Clinton's side began staffing up in swing states 7-8 months ago, building lists of volunteers to door-knock the data-chosen voters, networks of civil-society allies, and armies of organizers (including some great vets of Bernie's campaign!) to make it all happen.  Trump has nothing like this, and the Republican party has barely been scrambling in just the past month or two to come up with some semblance of ground game, and fallen far short.  Having been out there for months for Bernie, and known dozens if not hundreds of others who've done that, and also who are out for Hillary, this matters.  Not enough to create a swamping landslide, but by enough (2-4%?) in a close election like this that it should hearten us.

So we should all Keep Calm, and Carry on--and direct any restless energy we might have into some GOTV calling!

Sunday, September 25, 2016

Two Elections: Russia & America, mirrors of Apathy & Stability

Russia's 2016 Parliamentary Elections--Sunday, September 18 2016

Last Sunday, about 48% of eligible Russian voters (according to official data) turned out to give Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party a victory in the 4th parliamentary election since he came to power.  It's been dubbed Russia's most boring election yet.  The government probably manufactured about two fifths of its victory through fraud, but the 2nd, 3rd, & 4th place parties all support the Putin system, too, and the only parties that truly stand as opposition attracted the votes of barely a twentieth of those bothered to show up.  This is one of the lowest turnout national elections Russia has seen since the fall of Communism (although the 36% of Americans who voted in our last Congressional elections is even worse).  Are Russians suffering under Putin's regime, and thus desirous of a change, but too afraid to vote for it?  Or is the Russian electorate genuinely quiescent because hardly anybody is really that dissatisfied with the system?

Two years into Russia's most severe recession since the 1990s, the latter answer seems correct to me.  From my many trips there, and contacts I keep up with friends and former students there, the impression I've always had reflects the perspective one Russian facebook user posted about on Monday, to explain why Russians of his generation don't come out in support of the opposition.  The late 1980s and 1990s in Russia were so horrific, economically, and left such an indelible mark on Russians' political consciousness, that they have become the touchstone for comparison to determine how things are now.  In 2016, budgets have been cut, inflation is up (especially on food), and in a few places wage arrears (employers--including government entities--can't make payroll, and so simply fall into arrears in what they owe workers, sometimes for weeks or months) have shown up again.  But unlike the 1990s, nobody is losing their life savings to inflation.  People all have jobs and enough to eat.  Apartment blocks aren't wallowing in horrific states of dilapidation, nor being blown up by terrorists.  People have cars, access to health care, and many can still afford seaside vacations (many in newly-acquired Crimea, which is ironically probably cheaper now than it was three years ago, the last time Russians vacationed there under a Ukrainian government).

Could things in Russia be better?  Of course they can--Russians were doing extremely well economically less than a decade ago.  But that was under Vladimir Putin's rule, as well, so why vote against his party?  Today's democratic opposition, as disorganized and divided by petty personal ambitions as it is, is also directly connected in Russians' minds to the 1990s, the Yeltsin era--and economic depression that has no comparison in the minds of today's Russians.  The idea that a European standard of living and degree of public freedom, a reduction of corruption and the installation of a pluralistic society with the levels of comfort and opportunity that people enjoy in Germany, France, the Low Countries, or even the Central European post-communist countries that are now in the EU seems unrealistic for most Russians.  These social goals, that inspired Ukrainian protesters in late 2013 and early 2014 who wanted to bring that country into the family of Europe simply don't look plausible in Russia.

So then, why rock the boat?  On the whole, Russians would prefer the known path they are on, even if it seems headed downhill, than to blaze a trail off in a new direction--perhaps over a cliff.  And the majority of Russians would really just rather live their own lives, attend to the prospects of their own family, friends, and themselves, then wear themselves out engaging in politics, which at best cannot change things, at worst could be dangerous, and in any event will be exhausting and dispiriting to those who have any public spirit to begin with.

Americans: Citizens or Subjects?  Participants in Democracy?

The majority of Americans are almost exactly like the majority of Russians, in terms of how they feel about commitments to their own, personal, private spheres vs the public sphere and participation in their own democratic government.  Americans have a far higher quality of democracy than do Russians: far less corrupt, far more open to participation (which is far safer), far more avenues to voice their opinions, and far more competition and capacity to hold their leaders accountable than Russians.  But while some Americans take up the privileges and duties of citizens of a democracy, the vast majority of them don't act like they live in or care about democracy--they act just like the majority of Russians do.

Here in Texas, I've been working in the past week to register voters, which means walking up to complete strangers, asking point-blank if they're registered to vote yet, and if they want to, then helping them fill out a brief form.  While many students and grocery-store customers have been willing to, the great majority are not willing to register.  Of those who won't, many will respond that the choice they face for president this year is so dismal that they're not interested.  Others, expressing something similar, say it won't matter who they vote for, because all the choices are bad.  (The majority of those who refuse have clearly not even thought enough about it to articulate, or probably even have, a reason.)

While these opinions are certainly disputable, what is indisputable is that the reason we have the two most unpopular major-party nominees in history is that the huge majority of Americans didn't care to participate in the primaries: On the Democratic side, about 17 million people voted for Hillary Clinton, and 14 million against her, while on the Republican side, 13 million voted for Donald Trump, and 16 million against him.  While the fairness, process, funding, and media attitudes during the primaries are all open to criticism by those who don't like one, the other, or both candidates, the greater truth is this: 160 million Americans eligible to participate in the process that produced these two candidates failed to do so.  Maybe some were physically, financially, or bureaucratically unable to participate, but not all of them, nor surely even a significant portion.  If just one tenth of those who failed to show up when we picked our major party nominees (a process that's been virtually unchanged in most of our lifetimes, that is taught about in required classes in middle schools, high schools, and many colleges--at least here in Texas it's required), had done so and voted for other candidates--against Hillary & Donald--we would have a different pair of nominees this November.  This is indisputable.

The fact that those who claim they won't participate now because they don't like the choices on offer have no one but themselves to blame (their own failure to participate during the primaries) is piquant, but probably not worthwhile to dwell upon.

Perhaps worthwhile is why the majority of Americans, like the majority of Russians, can't be bothered.  There are lots of negative pressures or personal failings we could assign as causes for how low people's interest & desire to participate is.  But still, this is America, the country that claims a unique history, tradition, and very identity with Democracy.  Moreover, this is the government that rules the land--that holds power of life and death over everyone ("a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence"), that decides peace & war, how much you'll have to pay in taxes or traffic fines, controls education, trade, abortion, infrastructure.  It's really important, and not just for "this election."

But my answer to the question of why so few Americans care to participate in what's regularly upheld as a hallmark of American-ness takes a different approach than a speculative weighing of the costs & benefits of expending the rather scant resources of time & energy to participate.  I'm interested in opportunity costs: what else are Americans doing with the small amount of time & effort that they could otherwise have spent on registering to vote, generating enough of an opinion to cast a vote, and then casting it?

They're doing much the same things Russians do: they're eating dinner, going grocery shopping, answering a friend's text, heading to work.  Often they're dealing with their kids, maybe watching TV, possibly working long hours, maybe at multiple jobs, or exhausted from doing the same.  They're trying to figure out which Costco account to sign up for; they're trying to get tenure; they're talking to their spouses or taking care of elderly relatives.  They're fixing their cars or mowing their lawns, or snapchatting with a potential hook-up.

They're engaged in their private sphere of social and economic activity--family & friends & career & household (including both work & entertainment).  These take up so much of most people's time & energy, that there's nothing left over for democracy, even though the bare minimum of voting takes very little effort, for most people.

This is certainly not true of everybody--after all, 60 million people did vote in the primaries, and an additional 60 million or so will probably vote in November; and many people go to school board meetings, or volunteer time for charity work.  But I'm not speaking of those people; I'm talking about the ones I can't get to register to vote.  Public-spiritedness may be alive and well in a fraction of the American population today, but that fraction is too small.  Indeed, at the last Congressional election in 2014, I know a number of political science professors who didn't bother to vote.  If educators within the very field of politics, responsible for the instauration in future generations of the values of our American democracy are too pre-occupied with trials and travails of their own private spheres to vote, there's a big problem in America.

The private sphere has been so valorized in America, and the fields of activity that contribute to private flourishing--education, career, kids, house, cars, nutrition, fitness, entertainment, insurance, tax-planning, retirement, vacation, health care--have undergone such hypertrophy in both their number, and more importantly, the imperatives of attending to them, that for the vast majority of Americans, there is no obligation to one's (or one's family's) private flourishing too small push out any activity undertaken in the public spirit.  Even among those with the most resources, who've gotten the best educations and high-paying jobs, we often congratulate ourselves for fulfilling the bare minimum requirement of democracy by merely voting.  The idea of stumping for candidates, volunteering time to register voters, or even running for office is barely conceivable to most of us--we're too busy to make democracy work.

One of the most pernicious catalysts of this problem is social media: facebook posts about politics and the election are a palliative for many people's pinches of conscience about participation (especially academics) that emotionally exempts us from the responsibility to actually do anything outside the virtual world that might make a real difference, to connect with the unengaged, or with people from different walks of life.

Now I'm sure that most people who post on facebook about how terrible this or that candidate is, or how desperate the stakes of the elections are, or how unjust are the agents of justice hired by our elected official, do almost always vote.  But we should see that as a  bare minimum.  Many give money, too, which does do something, but also alienates the donor's political responsibility onto some paid staffers somewhere, who are overworked & underpaid (often to an unconscionable, and now actually illegal degree, by Democratic no less than Republican candidates), usually undertrained, and often hamstrung by a lack of willing & able campaign volunteers.

If everybody who posts on facebook about politics spent an equal amount of time signing up new voters, phonebanking for the campaigns of the candidates who would address the injustices that bother them, or knocking doors to identify supporters & get out the vote, instead, we would go a long way towards making American democracy real, rather than the money-dominated, mass-media-manipulated, de-personalized and anti-community elitist affair it appears to so many to be.  I challenge everybody who reads this to catch yourself before you post or re-post something about the election, and instead spend those few seconds looking up how you can volunteer locally to register voters, or help your preferred candidate or party.  And then actually do the volunteering.  As I found out when registering voters this week--whether ex-felons or college students who didn't know they were eligible, it can be really uplifting and inspiring.

America & Russia: The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity

I challenge us all (myself included!), because we need it--we need our American democracy not to come to resemble Russia's.  Because there are those who want it to, the ones backing the presidential candidate who has lionized Russian president Vladimir Putin, although for the most part, they know not what they do.  This is one phenomenal inversion of the Russian case in America: if Russians are hesitant to stand up for change in the face of a poorly-performing autocracy because they know--and are afraid--of how much worse things can get, then a dangerously large swath of Americans are pushing for the destruction of our values and institutions because they don't know how good they have it.

It's true that in the past few decades, things have gotten worse for a lot of people in America.  Income inequality has gotten worse in this country, the jobs on offer are worse and less stable than they were before and the expenses most Americans face are harder to afford. Higher education seems more out of reach to many Americans than it used to be.  The solutions that America has used to address racism, crime, drugs, low-quality education, and deficit spending have evolved their own pathologies and problems.  But to submit the whole system to the guidance of someone like Donald Trump is to call for a leap into the abyss (I suspect I'm preaching to the choir for anyone likely to come across this blog).

If the 1990s are the reference-point for Russians, and as problematic as Russian society is today, they won't risk standing against injustice & corruption for fear of returning to that abyss, for Americans backing Trump, the reference-point is the imagined era when America was "great."  And the dark reflection of Trump supporters being so enamored by the force of anemoia (I had to look this up) that they will risk any amount of upheaval, corruption, and destruction offered by a sexist, violent, bullying, lying, arrogant, faithless, corrupt excuse for a businessman whose entire career has been devoted to swindling people, and whose only qualification to be leader of the free world is his celebrity, is a reality that would have been unthinkable in any previous era of American democracy.  (Ironically for the implicitly backward-looking slogan of his campaign, there is no way that someone as ethically bankrupt and devoted to private gain at the expense of other people and the public good could ever have come this close to the presidency in any historical era of American greatness he or his supporters might point to.)

Fortunately, those American voters so callous, foolish, and (in some significant proportion) undoubtedly racist enough to desire to loose Trump's blood-dimmed tide upon the world are not so numerous enough to overwhelm this nation.  They're only about 4% of our population, to judge from primary voting.  And yet 4% filled with passionate intensity may easily bully and bludgeon the rest of us into submission, if we continually show so little conviction as to spare no time from our "busy" schedules for any but the bare minimum of democratic participation.

We friends of justice, equality, and democracy may feel like the biggest enemies we are fighting are Trump, and racism, and the Koch brothers.  But the truth is that our biggest enemies are our own pre-occupations with the private sphere, our own fears that we will not flourish sufficiently if we don't devote almost every morsel of time & energy to our careers, families, children, homes, nutrition, etc.  I may feel good that I spent six hours registering voters this week, but that's the first real political action I've participated since the end of my stint with Bernie Sanders six months ago.  I've been as woefully reluctant to cut into my private sphere as anybody.

But from now on, I'll pledge not to.  I'll start with the next 17 days of voter registration here in Texas, but I won't let it end on November 8th.  Please join with me, pledge mutually, as did the fifty-six signatories twelve score years ago--whether you're already engaged in multiple public spheres and activities, or whether you like me have fallen submerged into the all-consuming private sphere, and want to turn over a new leaf--a real one, not just a virtual one.  Make some campaign calls!  Find out how to register voters in your area!  Knock on some doors for a candidate who will lead us higher up the mountain towards a more perfect union, rather than over a cliff into the abyss.  Leave a comment if you want, so I'll know you're with me, and have the conviction Yeats was so concerned for the lack of!

Friday, July 1, 2016

Brexit & EU, Hillary & Trump, Obsessions with an "Alternate Reality"


Upset about Brexit

Since the people of Britain voted by a 4% margin to take the enormous cultural, economic, and geopolitical step of leaving the EU last week, my Facebook feed and daily news perusal has been deluged by lamentations.  Practically no sources I run across apparently find common cause with Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party and the most prominent generative force behind Brexit (or at least, none of them want to say so on Facebook).

Some of the lamentations are connected to the vote as a harbinger of a turn away from an open society; others are concerned about the racial-cultural backlash against the increasing number of inhabitants of the British Isles who are not as WASPy as those whose grandparents grew up there; and indeed others are gloomy about the economic fallout likely to damage the future of Britain, Europe, and maybe the world.  I found myself pretty sympathetic to these anxieties.

Brexit in UK = Trump in US?

Another trope of fear, however, was that somehow the narrow win for Brexit will prove to be a leading indicator or perhaps even a causal factor Donald Trump's incipient victory in the US presidential election this November.  I found myself less sympathetic to this direction of worried reasoning and added my own scrap of kindling to the Facebook fires by reminding to my friend that:

"The United States is not Britain,"

"A referendum is nothing like a presidential election (especially considering our country's Electoral College," and, most importantly,

"And Hillary Clinton is, I promise you, not the European Union," notwithstanding spite of any current conspiracy theories that she is no longer a human woman married to Bill Clinton, but rather a practically pan-European intergovernmental organization constituting 27 or 28 nation-states and run by bureaucrats out of the same place that used to administer the Belgian Congo (and with an eerily similar flag to that last and most brutal instance of colonial exploitation).

But seriously, aren't people mad at the establishment in similar ways on both sides of The Pond?

As against my dismissive Facebook response, there is an obvious and serious concern that the Brexit "phenomenon," which is now an electoral reality, emerges from the same kinds of dissatisfaction with the globalized pattern of increasing income inequality & stagnation that we see as strongly in the US:  The "haves" (whether they be the 1% or the the 30%)  have more & more, and the have-nots increasingly find that the storied economic mobility of free, capitalist democracies has gone the way of the cassette tape, disappearing sometime around the end of the last century.

In the end, though, patterns of party competition in this country, the Clinton campaign's advantage in financial and human resources (not quite as many bureaucrats as in Brussels, but almost), and the slow but steady dawning on more Americans that her fellow Democrat Barack Obama's stewardship of the White House has been a good thing, convince me of the position of Democratic strategist Doug Sosnik's analysis: "The 2016 election is already decided. History says Hillary Clinton wins."

The real problem: Nobody thought about the Possibility that became Reality

And yet, there is an important and upsetting similarity between Brexit & the US presidential election, though not so immediately dangerous one (at least, to my own normative view of the world).  That's the apparent broad obsession that people in politics, media, and indeed in their own conversations, have with dwelling upon, discussing, and opining about the way the world will not be the day after the vote.

In the long leadup to the Brexit vote, a lot of people were generally worried about Brexit, while in the last couple of days beforehand a few opinion polls showing that Brits would vote narrowly to "Remain" made people (especially financial trader people) increasingly confident that the next day, Britain would still have a future in the EU.

But it turned out otherwise, and indeed, it turned out that even the people leading the charge for Brexit had no idea what that would mean.  As a British friend of mine echoed on Facebook in the days since, "they had no plan."  In fact, now we have a state of reality where the British Prime Minister is a lame duck, the most prominent Brexit-promoter in his own party Boris Johnson (who'd been the odds-on favorite to succeed him) has pulled his hat out of the ring to be the next PM, and there's no certainty who will be the UK's leader in two months' time.  Moreover, nobody knows when the all-important Article 50 will be "triggered" to begin the formal negotiations on Britain's new status vis-à-vis the EU.  And to help matters, the UK's opposition party appears to be entering a slow-motion leadership struggle of its own with nobody quite certain who will succeed Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, and Corbyn himself refusing to go gentle into that good night even as the great majority of Labour MPs want him out.

This enormous degree of uncertainty about very important things--and the implicit the failure of powerful people, who have a lot to lose or gain, to have lined up support or come up with a plan of what to do if Brexit won seems to suggest that most British elites--and perhaps even most Brits--were so preoccupied by the way world would (as it turned out) not be the next morning (ie, they all just thought Britain would still be in the EU), they'd devoted little or none of their brainpower to what to do in the case that eventually prevailed as reality:  Where, in truth, can we see the "Reality Based Community" among Britain's leaders, media, or pundits in the run-up to Brexit?

Indeed, the fact that it was such a near vote in the end could perhaps partially excuse the apparent failure to consider "now what happens?" beforehand.  (Though it was also a near thing whether Hitler would have invaded the UK during WWII, or whether the US would confront a Soviet satellite 90 miles off the Florida coast during the Cold War--obviously the former didn't happen, and the latter did--but would it be forgivable if, respectively, UK & US leaders, media, & pundits failed to consider "what happens now" in the alternative of either of those scenarios?)

In the US, obsession with what probably won't become reality threatens to leave us, as a polity, as flat-footed as Brexit leaders

Now we begin to see the parallel with the United States.  For a long time, I personally had been really hoping that the reality this coming November 9th would be Bernie Sanders headed to the Oval Office.  I had to give that up several weeks ago, and join what now appears to be the Reality Based Community that his opponent will quite probably be the president-elect.

But that's a hard to community in which to find any conversation--most of the news media (2/3 of WaPo's front page this morning, 3/4 of Bloomberg Politics, and almost all of NYT's political coverage) are preoccupied with the man who will mostly likely not be elected president, as they and have been unswervingly for the past twelve months.

Even a couple of weeks ago when I attended the Democratic Party of Virginia's state Convention in Richmond, state party leaders from Governor Terry McAuliffe to our Democratic congressmen, down to the merest party functionaries allowed on stage spent far more time talking about Donald Trump than about Hillary Clinton--they even made us watch a video of the most appalling things he's said (as if Democratic delegates were likely to be uninformed about him).  A few people said they loved Bernie (though the tokenism of the comment was as bald as Yul Brynner), and lectured us on how important it was to get Hillary elected, but nobody said anything about what policies she would put in place in the (quite likely real future) even of her being elected president.

And try finding anything from prominent news outlets about what life will be like in America where Hillary Clinton is president--you'll need magnifying glasses and forensic training.  I don't doubt a Hillary will generally undertake policies that I, as a Democrat, would favor, and she's not trying to keep her plans or their details a secret, by any means.  But somehow, almost nobody in the Public Sphere seems inclined to discuss what the next Clinton presidency will be like.  And those who do want to talk about it are mostly wanting tell us how horrible it will be, for example, to have the country run by criminals.

Is this dangerous?  In this particular case, I doubt it--I think the reality we'll be living in starting November 9th will probably be as good as can be expected from the American political system.

But in general, the propensity for us--especially our media & leaders--to ignore in public discourse the way the world really is (or is likely to be) in favor of what is less likely to actually prevail in reality (in the event, Brexit), or even what is fantastical (Donald Trump's presidency), is a huge problem.  I'll forbear speculating on the root of it, but it's something that must change if we're not to be caught as flat-footed by major (and often predictable) world events (climate change comes to mind most quickly, but it's hardly the one!) as Brexit's leaders have been by getting what they wanted!

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

The Republican Party--still a party? (Response to Jenkins & Heersink)

Today in the Monkey Cage, Jeffrey Jenkins & Boris Heersink invoke John Aldrich (Why Parties? Chicago UP, 1995) to demonstrate a phenomenon perhaps in need of explanation: how unusual (& risky) it is for Republican leaders to actually go against party by rejecting the candidate their own voters & rules have selected to be their presidential nominee.

Taking their observation to the next level--explanation--leads first through the common wisdom that Republican leaders see the short-term costs of threatening party unity as less than the medium-term costs of tightening their and their party's association with someone as terrible as Trump.  Of course, the Republican leaders could be wrong, since it might weaken or break apart the party in the long-term.  But a debate about the accuracy of their estimates according to this superficial-level explanation of why this is happening misses another direction the argument could take.

Indeee, a more illuminating explanation emerges from a deeper consideration of Aldrich, the meaning of "political parties" as entities, and the contemporary Republican party

Jenkins & Heersink wisely follow Aldrich in identifying parties as "long coalitions," constituted to bind together legislative voting blocs together and secure the votes of not just those who really want  any given policy, but a few others, as well, enough to win policy changes; while every given policy change may displease a small fraction of the party members, it will be a different fraction each time, and most members will get mostly the policy changes they want over time--and far more frequently than if each member were alone, without a stable "long coalition."

But this view of parties depends on the assumption that a) the party's leaders & elected officials actually want the government to do a set of things it's not currently doing, and thus change policy to enact that, and b) want a coherent-enough set of things that they can encapsulate it what Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper, 1957) would call an "ideology."  We today would probably just call it a party program, or set of ideals.

But the Republican party today seems united not by what they want the government to do, but only what they want it not to do, which seems to be almost everything.  For example, the party doesn't even seem to want the government to enforce the very tax laws that enable it collect the revenue to fund its activities.  Everything the Republican party desires seems to involve wanting the government to reduce or eliminate its activities, with regard to enforcing equality, maintaining infrastructure, promoting education, managing the macroeconomy, providing health care, health insurance, and ensuring retirement income, guaranteeing the rights of minority communities to full participation in society.

This amounts to an easy coalition to hold together in the long run, since it wants to do nothing, even with the ill-feelings that may come from division over the party's presidential nominee.  Republican leaders may be quite right that they will pay little cost in the next (Democratic) presidential term's legislative & electoral battles for not supporting Donald Trump: who among them would abandon their party's only universally shared tenet of "let's let nothing happen" in order to actually participate in something happening?  Certainly not anything that's likely to happen under a Democratic president.  Voters & gerrymandering have locked in the electoral benefit of this thinnest of ideological glue.

Anthony Downs defined a political party as an organization that seeks "to control the governing apparatus by legal means," specifically the means of "duly constituted elections."  But the Republican party, it seems, would prefer that apparatus not to exist at all, rather than try to control it.

It's true that actually undoing government altogether, especially eliminating entitlement-based programs or Federal taxation, would actually require a set of positive legislation to be passed (& signed), rather than just blocking policy enactment.

But herein lies the open secret of the Republican party's shared goal (too thin to be called an "ideology"): they don't seem to very strongly desire even those claimed reductions in government to come about--they're happy to simply keep the status quo, with some slow erosion.  This stance of talking a big talk, but actually just keeping government as it is (or slightly lesser) seems to work for the individual electoral goals of Republicans at every level, except the presidency.

And we can see that the Republican party leadership doesn't seem to really want to control the presidency.  If it did, it would, as a collective group, have gotten involved in presidential politics (in this or other cycles) by prodding stronger candidates to run, or picking one of the strongest candidates it had and really working for that candidate from the beginning.  (The Democratic party leadership, by contrast, has been quite hands-on about presidential races for the last several cycles.)

So Republican party leaders are indeed, as Jenkins & Heersink claim, acting contrary to the foundational logic of political parties.  This could weaken the party, or presage its breaking up (as happened to its predecessor, the Whig Party, a century and a half ago).

Or, it could indicate that the Republican party is simply no longer a "normal" political party, according to classical definitions.

It's instead a kind of mutant entity that calls itself a party, but has no programmatic goals or true desire to control the governing apparatus (akin to the party-like entities  that Schattchneider, 1942, calls "pressure groups" or "minor parties," but which don't really act like parties).

Such entities are common, and frequently call themselves "parties," even as the raisons d'être that hold them together are something else, like self-enrichment, office-holding for the sake of immunity from prosecution, serving a particular client or client-class, or something else that takes priority over gaining control of the government by means of duly constituted elections.

If this is true, the Republican party finds itself in the company of  Brazil's PMDB, Vladimir Putin's United Russia, and Chinese Communist Party, all of which prioritize other goals than what democratic political parties are all about.

Monday, April 4, 2016

The Unexamined Roots of the Case for Trade: More stuff is always better

International trade has been growing as a point of contention since the Trans-Pacific Partnership arrived in the public sphere a year ago, and has become increasingly prominent in the US presidential primaries. But lost in discussions about who gets hurt who is exploiting whom is a critical perspective on the central benefit of free trade: cheaper access to consumer goods.

The discussion of the effects of trade is simple to conceive of as a back-and-forth:
  • + Trade Case: Comparative Advantage!  If we can Product A more efficiently than Product B, and another country makes Product B more efficiently, then it makes more sense to make a lot of Product A, sell it to the other country, and buy Product B from them cheaper than we could make it ourselves. We'll spend less money to get the same or of both Products than if we made everything at home.
  • - Trade response: but when we start importing Product B instead if making it in America, all those good people at Product B factories lose their jobs!
  • + Trade Response #1: but if we've got more trade overall, more people get jobs at Product A factories, so it balances out.
  • + Trade Response #2: plus, the more trade we've got, the more efficiently everything is being produced and consumed, so we can afford more Products of every kind.
  • - Trade argument, at this point, usually devolves into demonizing foreigners who are "taking" the jobs of workers in Product B factories, or something about national pride, along with suspicious attempts to portray Product B factory workers as more truly "American" because of their blue-collar status, and thus more worthy of our protection--or else more well-founded targeting of the increasing profits that accrue from trade to the owners of capital.
Ultimately, though, economists and politicians defending more trade (often rolled into "globalization") are able to carry the argument not by parrying these points, but upon the seemingly unassailable Response #2, that the broad benefits for all outweigh the costs of the few who lose their jobs.  This utilitarian, even possibly socialist logic of "the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few" (Spock, or Jeremy Bentham?) is hard to argue against, which helps explain why the other side goes of into other types of counter-arguments.

But while the logic may be sound, the assumptions that underlie it deserve scrutiny.  What exactly is this broad benefit of trade that accrues to all?  Binyamin Applebaum (NYT) distills it as "Everyone gets a discount," while Thomas Black & Isabella Cota (Bloomberg) unpack slighlty more "the benefits of the surge of cheap imports, primarily subdued inflation that preserves consumers' purchasing power."

More and more access to cheaper physical things is the great benefit that trade provides--and indeed, if we can buy a TV from China for $300 instead of $600, are we not better off?  If we can afford to buy farm-raised shrimp from Southeast Asia for $6.99/lb instead of paying $12.99/lb for shrimp caught in the Gulf of Mexico, don't we have access to a better life?

The central benefit of trade depends on the refusal to posit that the answer to these questions might be "no".

But if we examine the lives of genuinely struggling Americans, facing poverty, joblessness, and the inability to climb up even the lowest rungs of the economic ladder, are these problems connected to constrained access to cheap goods and food? Is clothing too expensive? Cell phones? TVs? No: lots of families are trapped in cycles of poverty, but not because there is too little cheap stuff on offer to American consumers. Quality housing, less exploitative legal systems,  safe neighborhoods, and better-resourced schools are lacking, but those cannot be imported.

And what if we examine the lives of Americans in the precarious middle-class? It may be that the latest smartphone or tablet is more accessible because of trade with China, and new school clothes and fall fashions are more affordable because they come from factories in Bangladesh or Mexico. But the speedier integration of new technologies into the expected consumer basket has also loaded families with new expenses: your cable-internet package with all the right channels and download speeds to accommodate streaming over multiple devices may cost 6-7 times what you paid for cable in the 1980s, but incomes have not kept pace. And your family plan for smartphones is a new monthly bill altogether that 1990s budgets weren't forced to juggle. Indeed, many blessings of the "surge of cheap imports" come with monthly service charges that load expense onto services that cannot be replaced by trade (cell phone service cannot be imported), so are we economically better off?

A deeper problem is this: the access to lots more cheap imported goods has enormously expanded the potential participants and arenas of the most dangerous game in capitalism: "Keeping up with the Joneses." Conspicuous Consumption (Thorstein Veblen) is on the rise in reaches of the American income spectrum where it would have been simply unthinkable a half century ago, and in realms of consumption then not even imaginable: which G of iPhone do you have? What store do you buy your organic baby food at? Do you get the free version of Spotify or do you pay for Pandora?

Conspicuous Consumption, as a concept, is an enormous challenge to the basic assumptions upon which argument for trade rests. More trade is good if we are always only spending money on something that really makes our lives better, and thus, if any given thing we can get is cheaper, our lives are better because we can have more of it, or more of something else we otherwise couldn't afford that will make our lives better.

Conspicuous Consumption is the idea that due to social constructions of power and the fear of feeling inadequate (not to mention the power of marketing to get us to spend money on things that do not make our lives better), a lot of our spending is not driven by well-informed decisions about what we really want, need, or will make our lives better, but rather is wasted on things we're bamboozled into buying--many of which may make our lives much worse.

In the end, if trade's main benefit to "the many" has been expanding their capacity to buy more and more cheap goods that often do not make our lives better, but frequently make them more cluttered, expensive, and unhealthy, then the logical structure buttressing the “broad benefits” of trade falls away.

Sunday, November 15, 2015

Berning CVA

Canvassing in Culpeper VA Sat, Nov 14: Charlottesville Bernie troops provide reinforcements for the local Bernie outpost!
So the blog's been a bit moribund recently, alas!  Why?  Basically, because we've been so busy!  Jasmine & I both applying for lots of part-time work--looks like I'll be an Adjunct Prof of Economics for Piedmont Virginia Community College in the spring semester . . . unless something more compelling comes up before my background check clears.

But much more than professional activities, we've been busy with Bernie volunteering!  Apart from diving into organizational work of the Charlottesville & Central VA for Bernie volunteer group, we've been getting out the word collecting signatures for Bernie to get on the VA ballot.  The state actually has one of the higher bars to getting on the primary ballot (in fact, in 2012 Rick Perry, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum & other Republicans failed to make it on the ballot, leaving the Republican field to just Mitt Romney & Ron Paul).

On Election Day here in VA, when the entire state senate was up for re-election (and where Democrats put up the feeblest of efforts against Republican gerrymandering), Jasmine & I trolled our local polling places with Rachel, another Bernie volunteer, collecting well over a hundred signatures. We also collected a few nasty comments about Mao Zedong as well as accusations of the purveyance of male bovine excrement, due in part to a deficit of wisdom owing to our failure to have been born when Barry Goldwater was running for president.  We later learned that the precinct where we were (Baker-Butler elementary school, our own polling place, though we became Virginia residents too late to vote in the election) is the most conservative in Albemarle County (where Democrats swept the County board of Commissioners elections).  In other precincts around the city & county, our colleagues found lots of people willing to sign for Bernie: over 1,150 just from our Charlottesville group (Bernie apparently needs 5,000 for the whole state).

And even in our precinct we gathered over a hundred signatures and even got about half a dozen names of people local to this part of the county who want to join the offshoot Bernie group we're trying to start: Albemarle North for Bernie.  We have our second meeting this week at a volunteer's house in the beautiful town of Barboursville, where the pretty terrific and famous wine is made.

And we've found other outlets for our enthusiasm for the political revolution--such as the Charlottesville Raise Up for $15 minimum wage rally, where we showed up in Bernie paraphernalia and got to speak to the crowd, and even made it onto local TV, NBC 29 (about 20 seconds in)


and into the local paper, the Daily Progress, where Jasmine was quoted extensively, following her comments at the rally about the insecurity of non-benefit, temporary work, like the adjuncting she did at Colgate.

In general, it's exciting how vibrant a community we've found around here, and how much people like us seem to be accepted into at least certain quite politically active sectors--like the county Democratic party, one of whose vice chairs wanted to have coffee with me after meeting at the polls and invited me to their monthly meeting.

The abundance of dynamic grassroots political and social activism that we've found in Virginia could be due to many factors.  That Virginia is a purple state in flux, where Democrats and others on the left perceive chances to change things in the coming years, may inspire the openness to new actors & allies that they know such change will require.  This itself undoubtedly stems from a huge difference with Central New York: Central Virginia (and the whole state, really) is an area that is growing, on the upswing, and as new people arrive, looking for new opportunities, the ferment only feeds upon itself.  Central New York, by contrast, is decades into a demographic & economic decline, with young people, activists, and entrepreneurs (political, business, or otherwise) often needing to go afield for opportunities if they don't already have a secure place in the region's economic, political, or social structure.  Hamilton, NY has been lucky to attract a notable exception in the past several years in Good Nature Brewing, and its success and planned expansion do incite hope that more people will buck the trend by investing in Central New York, which those who have managed to make a solvent life there know has much to offer.

Of course, Charlottesville is exceptional in many ways, too: one of the wealthiest and most liberal areas of "non"-Northern Virginia, it's a hotbed for all kind of social, artistic, and political activities (and with the persistent delight of Southern courtesy that sets it apart from a Cambridge, MA or Brooklyn).

Culpeper, Virginia, by comparison, an hour up the road towards DC, is neither as prosperous nor as liberal.  Jasmine & I got to experience it yesterday when we drove there with some other local Charlottesville Bernie-supporters to join the lone member of the Culpeper for Bernie group, Earl (see the photo above), in collecting signatures at the farmers' market.  Culpeper is in Virginia's 7th Congressional District (one that's gerrymandered even more Republican than our 5th District) and no surprise it was the most in need of more signatures to be collected for the campaign.  The farmers' market was not nearly as active as what we've seen in Charlottesville, or in Hamilton (even though Culpeper has about 5x the population of the latter!), and it was a scrabble to get many signatures.

Interestingly, we got a bunch of signatures from people who said they're hardly regular Democratic voters, but want "anybody but Hillary" to be the next president.  Depending on which of the current occupants of the Republican clown-car gets nominated for president next summer, a Democratic nomination of Bernie Sanders could well generate a curious new phenomena: the Bernie Republican, foil of the famous Reagan Democrat.  We'll see.

But yesterday's jaunt was important for reasons besides just the signatures: one was helping Earl (and a couple of people who came out of the woodwork as potential Bernie volunteers) shore up his own sense of a movement for Bernie.  If there really is to be major political change in this country, a movement, then it's going to take people moving, at least for a few hours, a day, or a weekend: going physically to places where the movement is not as strong, and spreading the word, wearing the T-shirt, putting a human face to the concept of "Democratic Socialism" (which, after going over it with the chair of economics at PVCC, we decided is really just a brand of Keynesiansm).

And that's why we're here in Virginia, with no jobs, trying to get something started.  I was really excited this weekend by the people we met--vendors in the Farmers' Market who donated parmesan bread to the Bernie volunteers, an African American lady from a local church who's really excited for Bernie (and told us that she thinks her community might be holding its collective nose if Hillary is the name next to "D" on the ballot next fall), several Spanish-speakers who were  not registered to vote, but had clearly never been approached before in this country as members of a civic polity, and even some of the anti-Bernie people who were interested to mix it up a bit.  People like us--not just me & Jasmine, but everybody in the picture above--getting out there, talking to strangers, believing that there's more on offer for America than dynasties, elites who "know better," and apathy of the masses, and putting themselves on the line for something are what it will take to give the lie to the easy rationalization that Bernie can't win (which is in many cases = "we're stuck with the mediocrity we've got").  We can do it--not for Bernie, but for the sake of this country, and a people that need to wake up and realize that they can take back their own democracy.

Thursday, October 8, 2015

Bernie turning a corner? Young voter turnout Oct '15 => Nov '16

Since last week's release of fundraising numbers, and Bernie's huge rallies in Massachusetts, I think perceptions of his campaign are starting to take an important turn, with some who've dismissed him, even to the degree they are positively exploring how Bernie might change the terms of political expectations for Democrats in unlikely places.  This extends beyond potential cheerleaders or the putatively neutral to the likes of ultra-conservative Howard Kurtz, whose newfound engagement could be some kind of strategic bomb-throwing, or an attempt to be the right's canary in the coal mine.

An additional early (and potentially faulty) sign of a change in momentum is the first "defection" of a member of the Democratic establishment, AZ Congressman Raúl Grijalva (though, as head of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, on the fringe of establishment) who's become the first federally elected official to endorse Bernie for president (if NYC mayor Bill de Blasio follows through on rumors, this would be an even bigger indicator of establishment "melt" from Hillary)

Interestingly, this (perceived-by-me) shift in tone in the media has come at a time when poll numbers among the Democratic primary contenders have not budged nationally, or in early primary states (and in fact, while IA or NH have not budged, and a slew of more newly-polled states (links as of 10/8/2015) show Hillary with a commanding lead, and Bernie often in third place.  Why the change, then?

One answer explains why pundits are changing their tunes: Bernie is now polling better than Hillary in head-to-head match-ups with potential Republican nominees in the two swing states he's been most active.  Also, as Philip Bump of the Fix has shown cleverly, Hillary's flood of campaign-funds may well run dry before the year is out, while Bernie can go back to the well with his large number of small donors--650,000 at last count.  The Clinton campaign "did not disclose" (doesn't that phrase just sound like it was invented for Hillary?) its total number of donors.  And finally, Hillary's persistently negative net favorability ratings increasingly render her claim to better to being more electable than Bernie Sanders increasingly dubious.

But beyond the kind of short-term factoids like these which pundits attend to, there's a greater reason why they (and everybody!) should recognize the realistic chances of Bernie winning the nomination--and the general election (and hoping he does, unless you'd rather see a Republican).

It's buried inside the first national poll that shows Bernie in the lead over Hillary.  Now, before those in favor of Bernie get too excited about this poll, conducted for the Independent Journal (which seems to be a kind of conservative outlet), it should be noted that you won't see this on any poll-average aggregator, because it's an internet poll.

Why look askance at an internet poll?  The answer to this question is actually the reason why Bernie is the future Democrats should look to.  Traditionally, many internet polls depend on who shows up at a certain web-site, and as a result, their results are highly biased because liberals go to certain web-sites, conservatives go to others, etc.  However, examining the methods of Google, which carried out the poll, it looks like their Consumer Surveys division may have really solved this--and indeed with a sample of over 1000 likely Democratic voters (screened according plans to watch the debate next week), more than double that of any of the RCP-averaged polls, this looks like a very unbiased measure of likely-to-vote Democrats' preferences for Bernie vs Hillary . . . as long as they use the internet, that is.

And here is the bias that necessitates throwing this poll out of the averages: the population of the country that surfs the internet in this country is probably skewed in many ways, and definitely skewed young.  Thus, in a poll where Bernie beats Hillary 60%-28% among 18-24 yo, and 48%-32% among 25-34 yo, it's no surprise that we get a hugely different result from  most national polls, most of which still put Hillary out in front by 20%.

Indeed, the sample for this poll bears little resemblance to the electorate, in terms of age: estimating categories (Google breaks them up a little differently), see the skew in this poll compared to the Exit Polls from the 2014 Election:

Age Group
18-29
30-44
45-65
65
Google Poll
23%
27%
34%
17%
2014 Exit Poll
13%
22%
43%
22%

Clearly, this national survey of Democrats that would give Bernie a slight edge in October of 2015 looks nothing like the electorate that showed up to the polls at the last federal election.  That electorate, where Hillary runs well ahead in the last two age-groups, would give Hillary the win over Bernie easily.

But here is the key question: what do Democrats want the age-profile of the electorate on November 8, 2016 to look like?  If we want (and work) to make it look like one that would give Hillary the win over Bernie, then we will get an electorate that will likely give them the same result as the 2014 midterm elections.  

This is perhaps the strongest point in favor of Bernie's electability: a Bernie campaign and a Bernie nomination would be far more likely to give an age profile that looks like the bottom row here:

Age Group
18-29
30-44
45-65
65
Google Poll
23%
27%
34%
17%
2014 Exit Poll
13%
22%
43%
22%
2008 Exit Poll
18%
29%
37%
16%

That gave Democrats the best presidential election result since 1964.  

If we want something like that again, then we should look to and work for a similar electorate, for the good of our country.  We should not cling out of fear to the kind of presidential campaign (from the perspective of electoral age-profile) that must be at the heart of Hillary Clinton's campaign strategy. That is a recipe for de-mobilization, apathy, and disenchantment of the very youth voters Democrats need to win.

Even if you don't mind Hillary Clinton's policy stances, Democrats should back Bernie, because "We can win" beats "We're afraid to lose".

Sunday, October 4, 2015

Money cannot buy votes in America or: How Democrats can learn stop worrying about Hillary and Feel the Bern

In 1963, Peter Sellers starred as Inspector Clouseau in one of the most hilarious, ingenious screwball comedies of the era.  Who could have imagined that the next year would see an actor with such a capacity for absurd frivolity as about half the cast of a film that would go down in history as one of the most sobering cinematic treatments of the defining political dilemma of the age: the Cold War?

Perhaps the rise of Bernie Sanders to challenge the "biggest non-incumbent front-runner in modern presidential history," and certainly the idea that he'll win, is even more unlikely than vagaries of Hollywood and the artistic legacy of a brilliant, disturbed Englishman half a century ago.  But in these days of anxiety among the Clinton branch of the Democratic party, and increasingly desperate attempts by her campaign to show that she's "not as bad as people think," it's worthwhile to consider the biggest tangible advantage that she's been purported to have: Money.

Notwithstanding Mitt Romney's whining, we all know direct payments from candidates' (or their super pacs') coffers cannot purchase votes in America.  Money can be used to hire staff, finance GOTV operations, buy ads, run polls, or subsidize campaign swag, but what it cannot do by itself is draw voters to support a candidate.

Hillary Clinton still leads most Democratic polls (outside NH and a couple in IA), but she has a big problem: She's addicted to money.

And that is both cramping her style and devouring time that she should be using to focus on drawing voters to her (or at least stanching the hemorrhage in her support).  Hillary spent Thursday in Massachusetts, with four events--three fundraisers, and a policy discussion.  Her closed-door fundraisers apparently netted her about half-a-million dollars, but they only allowed six or seven hundred people to even see her (another four hundred turned out to the policy discussion, pushing her Mass interaction to just over a thousand voters).

Compare this to Bernie's Saturday in Massachusetts: his event in Springfield, originally scheduled for the steps of Springfield City Hall, then moved to a sports arena because of the size, was expected to draw 3,000 people.  Instead, 6,000 showed up to this free and open event.  In his campaign speech in Boston later that night, 20,000 filled the convention center down by the seaport, while a crowd of more thousands who couldn't fit stood outside in the chilly night air outside to watch him on the jumbotrons set up.

Although the excitement and enthusiasm of those already Feeling the Bern is one reason why we should be quite sanguine about Bernie's chances, even more important is these events' role in drawing people to the campaign; free and open to the public, and filling people with the excitement of participation, they have a great capacity to built an emotional tie that can connect undecided supporters to Bernie, like the 59 year-old lady from Belmont who told Globe reporters as she arrived that she was "uncommitted" in the contest, but "unenthusiastic" about Clinton.

And with Hillary's onerous time commitment to small ("intimate" is the word that sells tickets to such events) fundraisers (composed of people already so committed to her that they'll fork out $250-$2,700 just to get in the door), her ability to connect with voters not already solidly in her column is severely hampered.  If she seems impersonable, or is too scripted, such events (where she'll run into none of the surprises that Bernie has on his bumpy campaign trail) are unlikely to help.  But Hillary, or at least her campaign strategy, is addicted to money, and they seems the most direct route to it.

Bernie, and his campaign strategy, by contrast, are about people.  And indeed, if all the people who came to Bernie's events in Massachusetts yesterday gave $20 to his campaign, his campaign would receive just as much as Hillary's, with doors wide open and no cover charge!  In fact, this has already been happening for months, part of why Hillary was only able to raise $2m more than Bernie's $26m this summer, holding 58 fundraisers while he held just seven.

The truth is, people like Bernie.  And if his ideas seem crazy to anyone, it's only because so many of his have been disappointed or brainwashed into historically abysmal beliefs about how limited our system of government is in its ability to improve the country.  This campaign is about changing hearts and minds to help Americans remember an old truth about our democracy: that if they use the power of the vote, they are government.  Unfortunately for Hillary Clinton, she is too busy with fundraising and trying to appear hip to remember that an election is about a competitive struggle for the people's vote, not just the people's money, and I believe this is what is driving her ever lower in the polls.

Thus, anybody reading this who has wanted Hillary for president (as I used to, myself!), but is now struggling with anxiety about her personality, her capacity to best Marco Rubio or John Kasich, or even her qualification for highest office, should stop worrying and Feel the Bern.

Thursday, October 1, 2015

Money in Politics and devotion to a cause (Bernie)

Today, after the end-of-the-third-quarter campaign fundraising dashes for Bernie, Hillary, and the rest of them, the campaigns revealed how much money they took in during the first full quarter of fundraising.  Bernie raised $26m ($2m on the last day!), an increase from the $15m he raised up through June 30.  Hillary Clinton's campaign raised $28m, a drop from the $47m she raised previously.

It's true that Hillary did outraise Bernie, but the main story-line of this campaign news "event" is that Bernie's on the rise and Hillary's having problems.  She held 58 fundraising events in the period, while Bernie only held 7, and Bernie has had 650,000 individual contributors and has average donations of about $25, while for Hillary . . . well, her campaign won't say, but given how many of her big-dollar donors have been donating the maximum $2,700, it's probably less than half as many as Bernie's campaign has--maybe as few as 1/20th.

But beyond just the comparisons of how much money, and expectations, there's something else going on here, the comparison of how much money it takes each campaign to get campaigning done.  If Hillary had to take time out for a fundraising event two out of every three days in the quarter (many exclusively open only to those who could fork over hefty donations), then she's not campaigning as much as Bernie is, even while she's got more money.  And while Hillary has more campaign staffers hired, both as price consultants as well as "ground troops" in important states, Bernie might actually have more labor going into his campaign if you count not only hired help, but volunteers organizing events.

Here in Hamilton, we passed the hat around our group of about 30 people to spring for 2,500 4"x 6" campaign hand-out cards that were spread all around Whitesboro, NY, and other places in the course of canvassing.  None of this came out of the Sanders campaign coffers.  Does Hillary have such free labor on offer, or operations like "Coders for Bernie"?

I doubt it: Hillary's campaign is bought-and-paid for, because people just don't like Hillary enough to devote anything more meaningful than dollars to her campaign.  Hillary lacks charisma not just in the classic sense, but in the sociological sense: she doesn't have Charismatic Authority (Thanks, Max Weber!).  Her husband did, and millions of people wanted to do what he said because it became clear to them that it was the right thing to do, especially when he said it.  Bernie has the same capacity, which is why my wife & I quit our jobs to move to Virginia to volunteer for Bernie, and so many other people are devoting time & effort, not in return for paychecks & résumé lines, to the political revolution that Bernie is calling us to.